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Next to the swelling book shelves
in the natural sciences, there is a
growing library on the ethics of cli-
mate policy. is is of small surprise as an-
thropocentic climate change is one of the
greatest problems facing mankind. e im-
pacts of climate change pose a clear threat to
the rights and freedoms of many existing and
future persons; and they will exacerbate ine-
qualities between rich and poor countries.
Dangerous climate change was usefully deﬁ-
ned by the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change as a state of aﬀairs where
concentrations of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) in
the atmosphere trigger climatic impacts
suﬃciently grave to threaten global food pro-
duction, prevent sustainable economic deve-
lopment, and prevent ecosystems from
adapting naturally. ere are essentially four
distinct ethical concepts involved:
- Distributive justice: e capacity of the at-
mosphere to absorb CO2e is limited. e ac-
ceptable level of emissions is therefore a good
to which everybody is entitled a fair share;
and this involves everyone being permitted to
emit a certain amount of CO2 into the at-
mosphere. ese ‘permissions’ are scarce, that
is: the demand is higher than the availability.
Well-established distributive justice principles
can be applied to the problem of allocating
the absorptive capacity of the earth's atmo-
sphere in a broadly analogous fashion to the
problem of the just division of other scarce
resources (food, water, shelter) between hou-
seholds. From an ethical point of view, the
logic is the same regardless of whether the
item in question is a good or a bad (or a re-
source or a sink).
- International justice: is is the problem of
justice between diﬀerent countries, regardless
of the distribution that exists within those
countries. In reality, it is countries and their
political leaders, rather than citizens of those
countries, that negotiate emissions rights and
adaptation costs in the international arena.
Pure distributive justice could be applied if
there existed a single world government that
allocated fairly among its citizens. But the rea-
lity is that the international climate arena is
divided into quarreling nations enjoying dif-
ferential bargaining power and often pursuing
a narrowly deﬁned set of national interests.
- Intergenerational justice: is is justice bet-
ween members of diﬀerent generations, each
generation represented by an average indivi-
dual. e capacity of the atmosphere to serve
as a sink for CO2e is non-renewable in a
human time-scale. How should this unique
absorptive function be divided between
members of diﬀerent generations? e logic
of intergenerational relations is that, while a
delay in mitigation will only necessitate even
more drastic emissions cuts in the future, each
generation faces the cognitive problem that
they can only guess how eﬃciently, and ef-
fectively, subsequent generations will be able
to continue to the mitigation eﬀort. Yet, each
generation also has the duty not to engage in
the wishful thinking that the problem can be
left for descendants to solve. An additional ar-
gument is that all of the main greenhouse
gases remain in the atmosphere for many de-
cades after release. Combined with other iner-
tias integral to the climate system, the bulk of
the expected harm to humans from climate
change will be felt by future generations.
- Historical justice: Industrialized states bear
the brunt of the historical responsibility for
climate change but most of the regions suﬀe-
ring from the impacts of global warming are
in developing countries. Should the current
inhabitants of the major emitter countries
compensate the victims of their ancestors’
emissions of greenhouse gases? Take for in-
stance the case of Bangladesh and the US. Do
present US-citizens owe present Banglades-
hies compensation for the wrongdoings of
their ancestors?
Historical justice is often grouped together
with intergenerational justice, as both seem
to have to deal with justice in time. But this
seems to be matter of analytical convenience
rather than any underlying equivalence. Ob-
jections of compensatory (or historical) inju-
stice rest upon the identiﬁcation of distinct
groups of descendants, at least one injured
party and at least one causer of the damage;
whereas intergenerational justice typically fo-
cuses on the way in which inequitable acts or
social policies aﬀect the well-being of a typi-
cal member of a subsequent generation.
Fulﬁlling its interdisciplinary approach, IGJR
3/2009 brings together articles from distinct,
but overlapping, disciplines including ethics
(Lumer), epistemology (Hillerbrand), social
contructivism (Rothe) and political science
(Oleson et al.). e paper of Christoph
Lumer (University of Siena, Italy) establishes
a new criterion for our moral duties, dubbed
‘progressive norm welfarism’, and deduces a
principle of ‘no harm to developing countries’
from it.
Rafaela Hillerbrand (RWTH Aachen, Ger-
many) addresses the question of how episte-
mic uncertainties are of relevance for practical
decision making. It is shown that the precau-
tionary principle fails to adequately deal with
uncertainties as they arise in climate mode-
ling.
Following a social constructivist approach,
Delf Rothe (Helmut-Schmidt-University,
Hamburg, Germany) shows how the interests
of the actors in climate conferences have shif-
ted between Rio 1992 and now. As a result,
adaptation became more and more widely ac-
cepted as a necessary step in international cli-
mate politics whereas mitigation strategies
lost ground.
Kirsten Oleson, Lauren Hartzell and Michael
D. Mastrandrea (Stanford University, USA)
explore the advantages of a climate agreement
of those key nations responsible for 90 per-
cent of current emissions (instead of a global
agreement). e authors give three reasons
why these nations should act alone: ability to
act; responsibility to act; self-interest in ac-
ting.
We hope you will enjoy the articles in our
current issue.
Joerg Chet Tremmel
Editor-in-Chief
London School of Economics
and Political Science
Edward Page
Guest Editor
University of Warwick
Konrad Ott
Guest Editor
Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-
Universität Greifswald
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Climate Change, Intergenerational Justice and Development
by Prof. Dr. Christoph Lumer
bstract: e subject of this paper is
distributive justice in relation to ﬁ-
nancing greenhouse gas abatement.
After separating the various questions of distri-
butive justice in climate change (ﬁrst section)
and isolating the ﬁnancing issue (second sec-
tion), the paper explores whether any eﬀective
moral norms resolving this question already
exist. It is argued that such norms still have to
be constructed. As a basis for the further dis-
cussion, a criterion for moral duties is proposed,
progressive norm welfarism, which takes up the
constructivist idea (third section). ese ethical,
intuitive and political considerations ﬁnally
converge into a proposal for ‘no harm to deve-
loping countries’ (fourth section).
Questions of distributive justice in climate
change
Climate change raises several questions of
intergenerational, international and intrana-
tional justice, in particular: 1. Reduction tar-
get: How much should greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions be reduced? 2. Measure mix: How
much should we rely on emission reduction
and how much on adaptation, mitigation
and compensation measures? 3. Financing:
Who shall pay how much for these mea-
sures?
e importance and urgency of this ques-
tion has been made evident recently by vari-
ous developments. In 2006 the rapidly
increasing Chinese CO2 emissions surpassed
those of the USA, which for decades were
the largest emitter. Since 2005 industrial
countries have been emitting less CO2 than
the rest of the world. Whereas GHG emis-
sions in the 1990s increased by 0.9 percent
per year, in the ﬁrst (not yet full) decade of
the new millennium (2000-2007) they in-
creased by 3.5 percent per year. While the
carbon intensity of economic activities (i.e.
the amount of CO2 released per Euro GDP)
had decreased for decades, it increased from
2003 to 2005 – despite the eﬀorts to curb
emissions in several Kyoto Protocol signa-
tory countries. e main cause of this trend
reversal is the massive increase in energy
consumption in China and India, served
mainly by – outdated – coal combustion.1
ese also are problems of distributive jus-
tice because China and India do not recog-
nize any strong obligation to curb their
emissions. ey do not accept that they
should pay for restrictions on their emissi-
ons with strong constraints of their econo-
mic development – in particular considering
that the much richer First World countries,
which are polluting more per capita, did not
undergo analogous restrictions when devel-
oping at comparable economic levels and are
responsible for most of the high increase of
atmospheric GHG concentration occurring
since the industrial revolution.
Isolating the ﬁnancing question
Tradable emission certiﬁcates are not only
an important economic instrument for mak-
ing GHG attenuation more eﬃcient but
also an analytic device to separate – at least
partially – the question of reduction targets
(question 1) from the question of how to ﬁ-
nance this reduction (question 3).2 e que-
stion of reduction targets corresponds to
determining the total number of emission
certiﬁcates, whereas the ﬁnancing question
corresponds to determining certiﬁcate distri-
bution. e latter holds because if trade in
certiﬁcates functions properly, having more
certiﬁcates is equivalent to possessing a cer-
tain amount of capital. e answers to the
two questions are only incompletely sepera-
ble though because fair answers depend on
people’s comprehensive well-being under the
respective regulations, and, of course, this
well-being depends on all the main factors
touched on by the two questions: the many
direct eﬀects of a more or less warm world
(from stiﬂing heat waves to climate casual-
ties e.g. by undernourishment), economic
abatement costs and economic development.
Whereas the question of reduction targets at
ﬁrst seems to be more an issue of intergen-
erational justice and the question of ﬁnan-
cing reduction a matter of international
justice, even this holds only partially; since
intergenerational and international justice
are intertwined for at least two reasons:
lenient global reduction targets (intergen-
erational justice) imply more damage to
poorer countries
(international jus-
tice) because these
countries are ge-
nerally more vul-
nerable (due to
their geographical
position their agriculture will suﬀer more, in
addition they have less money for adapta-
tion measures). And strong abatement obli-
gations / fewer certiﬁcates for poor countries
today (international justice) ceteris paribus
imply less development and therefore more
relative poverty in the future (intergenera-
tional justice). Nonetheless, for reducing
complexity and for delimiting the unmana-
geably high number of possible options, one
can roughly ﬁx one of the variables by assu-
ming more or less plausible values for this
resulting from other discussions and try to
give a justiﬁed answer to the other question
on this basis.
So, to answer the ﬁnancing question, we
need a rough idea of the reduction target.
However, in the literature rather divergent
targets have been proposed. One problem
that has led to this divergence is the great
disparity of advantages and disadvantages
accompanying the various options. Simple
moral principles do not allow considering
and pondering all of them. For that purpose,
complex and elaborate models are needed to
quantify all the advantages and disadvanta-
ges in one common currency. e currency
economists use is money; they usually pro-
pose rather modest reduction targets. Most
ethicists, however, ﬁnd that money cannot
capture the real moral value of things; many
of them prefer the currency of well-being or
utility instead, which is expected to give
more weight to certain damages like death
and thus to lead to far more demanding re-
duction targets. However, welfare calcula-
tions with well-being as the general currency
are even more complex than monetizing, so
adequate calculations are still a desideratum.
A
Unless we stop dumping 70 million tons of global warming
pollution into the atmosphere every 24 hours,which we
are doing right now (…), the continued acceleration of this
pollution will destroy the future of human civilization.
/Al Gore/
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A much weaker though still, at least in the
long run, strong prompter would be moral
obligations sustained by informal social
norms, i.e. rather generally observed modes
of acting whose known non-observation will
be punished by informal sanctions imple-
mented by any other moral subjects, where
the informal sanctions may range from ut-
terances of disapproval to lynch law. e
most obvious candidates for such informally
valid moral norms are the no-harm and the
polluter-pays principle.
With respect to the no-harm principle,
however, it is not obvious what it requires in
this case. In an immediate sense, every
breath we take harms other people insofar as
it (albeit marginally) increases the atmos-
phere's GHG concentration. Of course, it
would be absurd to require not harming
other people by not breathing. e problem
is that any, even marginal, emission is harm-
ful only on the basis of an already tremen-
dously high level of emissions by other
people. So a more sensible interpretation of
the no-harm principle is to, ﬁrst, determine
which global level of GHG emissions would
be harmless in the sense of being sustain-
able, then, second, to break this global budg-
et down to the individual level, e.g. in an
egalitarian fashion, and, third, to take trans-
gressions of these individual budgets as the
harms prohibited by the no-harm principle.
e ﬁrst step leads to a rule similar to the
above mentioned sustainable reduction (op-
tion a4), with the important diﬀerence of re-
quiring sustainable reduction immediately.
e fact that the vast majority does not ob-
serve this limit,8 according to the deﬁnition
of ‘informal norm’, already implies that a re-
spective informal moral norm is not socially
in force. In addition, immediately reducing
all persons’ GHG emissions to a sustainable
level would cause severe economic damages
to other persons as well, which means that
the no-harm principle would be violated in
any case. And ﬁnally, the second step, i.e. to
distribute emission rights equally, is not mor-
ally evident because this rule considers nei-
ther interpersonally diﬀerent needs and costs
nor abilities to pay.
e status of the polluter-pays principle is
not much better because it is far from clear
what this principle requires in the case of
to cooperate, i.e. not to abate their emis-
sions, even though mutual cooperation
would be better for each individual), is to
sign a binding contract for reaching forced
mutual cooperation.
However, the strategy of simply relying on a
contract is problematic for several reasons,
which require at least a moral complement
to contractualist proposals. First, a better cli-
mate, the aim of cooperation, is a public
good (or, more precisely, a common-sink re-
source). is implies that even those who do
not participate in the contract proﬁt from
other people’s participation in an agreement
(the USA have proﬁted in this way from the
Kyoto Protocol, free riding on the signatory
states’ eﬀorts). erefore, the usual threat in
negotiations, i.e. that without mutual agree-
ment and, therefore, in particular without
one’s own agreement everybody is reduced
to the status quo, does not work in this case.
Unforced agreement has to be based on rea-
sons beyond the expectations for a better cli-
mate, in particular on moral reasons like
wanting to be fair or to contribute to a bet-
ter future. Second, contracts can be made
only between living people. However, the
biggest advantages of a contract (and disad-
vantages of a failure) would inure to future
persons; and in a fair contract their interests,
of course, have to be considered. Because
their interests do not coincide with those of
present persons and require stronger envi-
ronmental investments a morally just con-
tract calls for a moral engagement beyond
the satisfaction of the present contracting
parties’ personal interests. ird, even if cli-
mate protection were not a public good (so
that only those who participate in the con-
tract would proﬁt from improvement mea-
sures) the potential damages as well as
advantages and disadvantages are distribu-
ted so unequally that a merely rational con-
tract (e.g. according to the Nash solution)
would be far from just - as is often the case
with rational contracts. So it might be a ra-
tional, though morally disgusting, result that
the most aggrieved have to pay the strongest
polluters for reducing their GHG emissions.
So a morally just contract again requires a
moral engagement beyond the parties’ per-
sonal interests.
What could motivate such a moral engage-
ment? e strongest kind of prompter
would be moral obligations sustained by for-
mal, i.e. legal norms. However, the problem
is that such norms do not yet exist; the fair
contract to be concluded should constitute
exactly such a norm.
I have undertaken such a study, which in-
cludes also the application of several ethical
standard criteria.3 On account of the con-
vergence of these criteria, the study’s results
with regard to the morally best and morally
required CO2 reduction targets may provide
a rather strong basis for assuming a reduc-
tion target in the present context.
In the study four options were considered,
namely a1: business as usual, a2: global sta-
bilization of GHG emissions at the 1990
level, a3: strong (25 percent) GHG emission
reduction with respect to 1990 until 2015,
a4: sustainable (60 percent) GHG emission
reduction compared to 1990 until 2035. (A
50-70% reduction of emissions is needed to
prevent most of the usually projected dama-
ges.4 In 1990 sustainable reduction meant a
decrease to about 0.4 t C/capita x year.) Sus-
tainable reduction (a4) turned out to be mo-
rally best or morally required by the vast
majority of the moral criteria taken into ac-
count.5 Considering, however, that annual
global CO2 emissions from 1990 (5.85 Gt
C/yr) to 2007 (8.1 Gt C/yr) increased by
roughly 39 percent (China alone: increase
from 0.7 to 1.8 Gt C/yr),6 the morally best
option now seems almost unreachable.
erefore, the following discussion will pre-
suppose that the community of states will
ideally only strive for strong reduction until
2030.
Are there eﬀective moral norms for the
ﬁnancing problem? – A case for moral
constructivism and progressive norm wel-
farism
With respect to the interests of future
people, GHG abatement may be a moral re-
quirement. However, among present people
(and the states representing them), GHG
emissions – like many other environmental
problems – constitute an n-person prisoner's
dilemma: (i) for (almost) everybody, higher
GHG concentrations are worse than (ii) the
lower concentrations that could be reached
by global cooperation in reduction eﬀorts;7
but (iii) if only few people make strong ef-
forts their situation is even worse than it
would be if no eﬀorts were made at all (be-
cause the eﬀorts are costly, but the global re-
duction achieved is only marginal); (iv)
ﬁnally, free-riding on the vast majority's re-
duction eﬀorts is the best option from a self-
ish point of view (the free-rider beneﬁts
from the better climate without paying for
it). e most obvious and, in this case, prob-
ably only solution to the resulting dilemma
(i.e. that rationality requires the egoists not
89
Global warming causing climate
change may be the ultimate issue
that unites us all.
/ Louise Burfitt-Dons /
An even weaker form of moral obligation
that could perhaps enforce moral engage-
ment in the climate question could result
from the ontological kind of moral norms
endorsed by moral realists (like Brink,
McNaughton, Schaber), who think that
there are moral norms independent of our
subjective attitudes. However, in metaethics
the idea of such a moral reality has been
strongly criticized for ontological, epistemo-
logical and practical reasons.12 Here is not
the place to elaborate these arguments. I can
only assume that such a moral reality and its
norms probably do not exist.e positive
lesson of those criticisms is that moral reality
is a man-made construct and that stronger
moral norms, which really help to resolve
the problems of global warming, have to be
socially introduced and enforced, preferably
by legal norms.
So, there are no norms in the deontological
sense and hence no obligations in a strict
sense apart from legal and socially valid
norms. Not all legal and social norms, how-
ever, are at once moral norms and obliga-
tions - think e.g. of racist laws - but only
those that can be morally justiﬁed, namely as
being morally good according to a concep-
tion of the morally good. e most widely
accepted family of such conceptions is wel-
farist, i.e. it conceives the moral desirability
of an object p as a function of the indivi-
duals’ desirabilities / utilities of p. One such
conception is utilitarianism, which equates
moral desirability simply with the sum (or
the mean) of all the individuals’ respective
desirabilities of p; another conception is
prioritarianism, which gives greater priority
to improving the lot of people worse oﬀ, and
the greater priority, the worse oﬀ these
people are; still a further conception is mod-
erate welfare egalitarianism, which over and
above the sum of individual desirabilities
gives higher rankings to more equal distri-
butions; etc. In the following, I presuppose
one of these welfarist conceptions of the mor-
ally good; but for the present purpose it is
not very important to specify which one.13 If
our moral obligations (in the strict sense) do
not go beyond what the morally good legal
and socially valid norms require, this is far
less than what we can morally do. Most
utilitarians ﬁnd that this is insuﬃcient and
postulate a moral duty to always do what is
morally best (in utilitarian terms). However,
this has been criticized as an excessive de-
mand and as moral exploitation; in addition,
it again postulates an ontologically obscure
obligation. A far more appealing middle
Intergenerational Justice Review
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course between an illusory excessive demand
and the unambitious fulﬁllment of low ob-
ligations is progressive normativism. Progres-
sive normativism tries to raise the standards
of moral duties at least historically, in the
long run. It says, ﬁrst, that morally respon-
sible people should politically try to enforce
the morally best legal and informal norms
that are currently realizable, thereby histori-
cally improving the stock of social norms,
and, second, that everybody is morally
bound to such norms. Progressive normati-
vism thus implements the constructivist les-
sons concerning the reality of moral norms.
In the following welfarism will be taken to
be the right conception of moral value, and
progressive normativism will be presupposed
as the right conception of moral norms;
their combination may be called ‘progressive
norm welfarism’.14
A proposal for constructing the ﬁnancing
norm: no harm for developing countries
Progressive norm welfarism is a basic and
general criterion for moral evaluation and
moral duties (a “primary principle”, so to
speak). Now we have to look for more con-
crete and speciﬁc precepts, directives or
norms (or, somewhat paradoxically, ‘second-
ary principles’) to be applied in more speciﬁc
situations, such as that of the ﬁnancing
problem, and which may be justiﬁed by the
primary moral principles. e no-harm and
the polluter-pays ‘principles’ are already such
more speciﬁc precepts; and so are the solu-
tions to be discussed in the following.
According to the discussion in the second
section, the ﬁnancing question can be
reduced to the question of how to distribute
(the reduced number of ) GHG emission
certiﬁcates. Many proposals regarding this
distribution have been discussed. Some of
them are rather implausible, so can be dis-
carded quickly. is holds in particular for
grandfathering and distribution according
to GDP.
Grandfathering means to distribute emission
certiﬁcates proportionally to present emis-
sions so that every nation has to reduce its
emissions by the same factor. is principle
rewards present emission ineﬃciency (i.e. in-
eﬃcient use of the limited sink capacities of
90
GHG emissions. It could require payment
for damages generated by emissions above
the sustainable level – but to whom? To fu-
ture generations via investing in a kind of
fund from which they will be compensated?
Again, this is far from being a common
practice and thus not an informally holding
social norm. And then, would not the best
investment be increasing the national capital
and since this is something we aim to do
anyway, so that the most important change
compared to the current practice would not
regard us but only our heirs (who would
have to use some part of the inherited capi-
tal for compensating those who will be da-
maged across the respective national
borders)? A stronger interpretation of the
polluter-pays principle demands that we also
pay the so-called ‘historical debts’, i.e. dam-
ages caused by excessive emissions in the
past. Again disregarding the diﬃcult ques-
tion of what ‘excessive’ would imply, it is du-
bious whether present people can have such
historical debts resulting from their ance-
stors’ activities or from their own activities
before the harmful eﬀects of GHG emis-
sions became more or less vague common
knowledge, i.e. around 1990. And since im-
mediate and radical emission cuts to a sus-
tainable level at that date would have
extensively damaged the whole economic
system and thus other people, it is dubious
whether all post-1990 emissions above that
level have generated historical debts (Some
further discussion of historical debts will be
provided below).
e upshot of this discussion is that there do
not seem to be even halfway clear moral
norms already informally socially in force.
On the other hand, there seems at least to
emerge a vague informal social norm to
practically recognize one’s responsibility as a
GHG emitter towards the vulnerable and
future people by reducing one’s emissions
where this is not expensive as well as perhaps
also another norm for politicians to make
stronger emission reductions legally bind-
ing.9 (e internationally widespread moral
disgust about the former US-president
George Bush’s and his followers’ hardliner
activities would be part of the sanctioning
behavior belonging to this informal social
norm.) Although the fact that these norms
are becoming socially valid constitutes moral
progress, they are only vague and weak10 in-
formal norms, which - for resolving the pro-
blem - demand too little, do not provide
much motivation and cannot be establish a
guide for stronger legal norms.11
Your grandchildren will likely find it
incredible - or even sinful - that you
burned up a gallon of gasoline to
fetch a pack of cigarettes!
/ Paul MacCready, Jr. /
people better oﬀ (prioritarianism, leximin)
or because a welfare transfer from the better
oﬀ to the worse oﬀ is valued positively (wel-
fare egalitarianism). A third reason streng-
thening this preference still further is the
diﬀerence in the purchasing power of
money, which implies that the same dollar
spent on energy eﬃcient high technology
bought in the international market results in
greater losses in purchasing power for local
products in poorer countries than in rich
countries.
e preference between the two principles
in welfare ethics is evident. Whether this
preference shall be translated into a respec-
tive contract and legal norm, according to
progressive normativism, depends on the
question of whether this is the best norm
that could be realized; and since the prefer-
ence question has already been answered, it
now depends on the issue of whether
NHDC is politically realizable. Now, of
course, the vast majority of politicians in
rich countries will promptly oppose the im-
plementation of this principle simply be-
cause it costs more. However, at second
glance, ﬁnancing highly eﬃcient energy
technologies in poorer countries may well
turn out to be the only way of reaching the
desired global emission reductions because
it may be the only way to make these coun-
tries participate in a globally concerted
abatement eﬀort. Without this kind of ﬁ-
nancing and technological support, develo-
ping countries (in particular China and
India), insisting on their ‘right’ to fast devel-
opment, will probably continue to base their
development on cheap and dirty energy
technologies and thus ﬁrst nullify expensive
reduction measures taken in rich countries
and then bring the global trend on a waste
path - a nightmare scenario. Hence, NHDC
probably is even the only eﬀective policy to-
wards curbing radical climate change. And
this insight hopefully will also change the
behavior of realist politicians.
is argument also helps to resolve an open
problem, namely completing NHDC by ﬁx-
ing the upper limit of countries whose GHG
abatement shall be ﬁnanced by rich coun-
tries. In principle, the initial arguments in
favor of NHDC as against certiﬁcate egali-
tarianism (i.e. lower utility loss if rich coun-
tries pay for the reduction than if poor
countries do) lead to taking that mean na-
tional income that is identical to the global
mean (always corrected for purchasing
power) as the upper limit of passive abate-
ment subvention. is is against the spirit of
Intergenerational Justice Review
Volume 9 · Issue 3/2009
rich (OECD and rich OPEC) countries pay
the GHG abatement of poor, developing
(and perhaps poor emerging) countries,
whereas the middle group of countries only
pays their own emission reductions. Accord-
ing to certiﬁcate egalitarianism, the emission
certiﬁcates for rich countries would be far
below their present emissions; however even
some of the poor countries exceed their
egalitarian emission limits so that these
countries, with certiﬁcate egalitarianism,
would have to invest a considerable part of
their development capacities into GHG
abatement; and that, in a certain sense, cons-
titutes a harm to them. e idea of NHDC
is to take these abatement costs of poor
countries by assigning them more than the
egalitarian share of emission certiﬁcates and
a lesser share to the rich countries. Shukla
e.g. has defended this principle.22 A model
for implementing this idea technically is
joint implementation in the way that rich
countries provide highly eﬃcient energy
technology to poor partner countries. In
order to get the biggest polluters into the
boat of GHG abating countries now, the de-
ﬁnition of ‘poor’ has to be stipulated so that
China (and hence India) counts as poor for
some more time still.
From a welfarist point of view – e.g. for utili-
tarianism, prioritarianism, welfare leximin
or moderate welfare egalitarianism – NHDC
is clearly morally better than certiﬁcate egali-
tarianism. ough certiﬁcate egalitarianism
beneﬁts the very poor countries, which may
gain from selling certiﬁcates not used by
them, countries who are somewhat better oﬀ
have already trespassed the egalitarian limit
or would do so soon under unrestricted con-
ditions. erefore, they have to renounce
further development or to invest in more
GHG-eﬃcient energy. e idea of NHDC
is to make rich countries pay for this invest-
ment instead of poor countries (as in cer-
tiﬁcate egalitarianism), because the resulting
welfare loss in rich countries will be lower.
e ﬁrst reason for this is the decreasing
marginal utility of income, whereby sub-
tracting one dollar from a poor person's in-
come decreases his utility more than
subtracting one dollar from a richer person's
income. Because of this reason, already
utilitarianism prefers NHDC to an egalita-
rian distribution of emission certiﬁcates.
Prioritarianism, moderate welfare egalitaria-
nism and welfare leximin make this prefe-
rence still stronger because they give more
weight to utility changes among people
worse oﬀ than to the same utility change for
the earth), obstacles or may even prevent de-
velopment in ird World countries, and it
is grossly unfair in terms of all major theories
of distributive justice like welfare egalitar-
ianism, prioritarianism, suﬃcientarianism,15
welfare leximin16 or utilitarianism etc.
Distribution according to GDP, which has
been proposed by Wirth / Lashoﬀ and Cline
as one component of a more comprehensive
distribution scheme,17 is diﬀerent from
grandfathering because GHG emissions are
not proportional to GDP, so it rewards emis-
sion eﬃciency to a certain extent. Distribu-
tion according to GDP, however, privileges
the rich and thus is again unfair, and
obstacles the development of poor countries.
Some distribution proposals which merit
more discussion are the following:
Certiﬁcate egalitarianism, popularized by the
Global Commons Institute under the name
of ‘contraction and convergence’, aims at an
equal distribution of emission certiﬁcates to
all persons (convergence) over the medium
term, where the sum of the certiﬁcates is de-
ﬁned by a global reduction target (contrac-
tion). Certiﬁcate egalitarianism is a speciﬁc
precept (dealing only with certiﬁcate distri-
bution), which may be justiﬁed as an appli-
cation of the (primary) moral principle
‘resource egalitarianism’. Welfare egalitarian-
ism, which is another (primary) moral prin-
ciple, on the other hand, will not lead to
certiﬁcate egalitarianism because an equal
number of certiﬁcates for diﬀerent people
will often lead to diﬀerent levels of well-
being or welfare. Certiﬁcate egalitarianism
has found many supporters among theo-
reticians.18
Historical responsibility is a precept to be ap-
plied in combination with other maxims,
e.g. certiﬁcate egalitarianism, and requires
polluters who in the past have exceeded the
justiﬁed limit of emissions to pay for the da-
mages generated (historical debts, cf. sect.
3). Usually the respective responsibility is at-
tributed to states, and the historical debt is
calculated on an egalitarian basis, i.e. excess
emissions are equal to actual emissions
minus individual emission budget times po-
pulation size. Historical excess emissions
have been calculated (and their redemptions
proposed), e.g. starting from the year 195019
or even 1800.20 e principle of historical
responsibilities has found supporters in par-
ticular among friends of poor countries.21
No harm for developing countries (NHDC) is
a distribution directive according to which,
on the basis of a tripartition of countries,
beyond their own emission reduction the
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progressive norm welfarism, which inter alia
should resolve the problem of excessive
moral demand. Progressive norm welfarism
blocks this excess by its criterion for imple-
menting new norms, which aims at en-
forcing the morally best norms that are
currently realisable. e combination of op-
timality and realisability leads to the proper
upper limit. e kernel of the initial argu-
ment is that the consumption of one Euro in
relatively poor countries leads to more utility
than the respective consumption in rich
countries. Now this argument would lead to
promoting development aid for the poorest
countries but not to invest the money in im-
proving the welfare in far richer countries
such as China. However, there are two addi-
tional mechanisms that radically change the
utilities. First, many of the impending dama-
ges caused by climate change, unlike the da-
mages resulting from global absolute poverty,
are threshold phenomena (aridization, mel-
ting of icebergs, etc), so that the utility of pre-
venting these thresholds from being exceeded
is extraordinarily high. Second, undertaking
actions that lead to eﬀective climate agree-
ments, which radically and eﬀectively curb
global emissions by including all major emit-
ters, would constitute a leap in utility with res-
pect to the current situation. is leap goes
far beyond the utility gained by shifting con-
sumption from rich countries e.g. to China.
Such a utility leap does not exist in the ﬁeld
of development aid - unfortunately. Getting
China into the boat of such a climate agree-
ment is crucial here and of strategic impor-
tance, because China is the strongest emitter,
with emissions still rapidly increasing, and be-
cause China is one of the richest countries
contemplable for receiving subventions - in
fact, many westerners think China is far too
rich to be eligible for subventions. However,
the utility leap results only from accompli-
shing the eﬀective agreement; subventions
beyond what is necessary in order to convince
strategically important contract parties lead
only to the initially considered shift in con-
sumption with a utility increase, in the case of
China, lower than the increase achieved by
investing in good development aid for the
poorest countries. e NHDC norm that can
be proposed on the basis of these reﬂections is
that, the upper eligibility limit for subven-
tions should be somewhat higher than the
present mean income in China, e.g. equal to
the Chinese mean income expected in ten
years (corrected for purchasing power).
ese considerations concerning the moral
value of subsidizing GHG abatement in rela-
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tively poor countries go hand in hand with
considerations concerning the current realis-
ability of NHDC. At present most western-
ers are not particularly magnanimous towards
Chinese people, as they are considered
responsible for the loss of jobs in richer coun-
tries. Though this attitude is neither jus-
tiﬁed nor fair, the strategic argument just out-
lined is probably the only one that might con-
vince these westerners to accept the suggested
norm - along with their concrete experiences
(e.g. of hurricanes) that the bad eﬀects of cli-
mate change will also be hitting home.
Would progressive norm welfarism adopt the
principle of historical responsibility and make
developed countries pay for their ‘historical
debts’? No. According to progressive norma-
tivism, social norms, in particular the norm of
indemnifying damages caused and still more
speciﬁcally the polluter-pays principle, have
the instrumental function of motivating
moral behavior. However, this function can
only be fulﬁlled if in the moment of decision
the agent knows which action is sanctioned
by the respective norm. Until recently (about
1990) no application of the polluter-pays
principle to GHG emissions could satisfy this
condition because the harmful eﬀects of such
emissions were not suﬃciently clear.23 Today,
of course, the polluter-pays principle should
enter the GHG contracts in the form of a
kind of ﬁne for exceeding GHG limits, but
not in the form of recognizing historical
debts.
ese constructive justiﬁcations of NHDC
without recognition of historical debts shall
now be complemented by some intuitionistic
arguments. Several pragmatic diﬃculties
count against the principle of recognizing his-
torical debts. Past emissions cannot be quan-
tiﬁed exactly, political boundaries and, above
all, population sizes have changed consider-
ably. Past GHG emissions were not only use-
ful for the immediate consumer but at least
some part was also useful for the whole of
later mankind insofar as these emissions were
a by-product of technical development that
also beneﬁted people in countries with his-
torically fewer emissions. Where it may be
sensible that together with our wealth we
have inherited also the costs generated by its
creation, it is far less clear why we should also
inherit mere costs of consumption that had
nothing to do with the creation of that
wealth. While people on an individual level
can reject a heritage it is unclear whether and
in what way we can reject a collective her-
itage; and if this is unclear the application of
the heritage idea to the collective level may be
unfair. Finally, historical debts will eventually
have been paid, so that indemniﬁed countries
needing special help will no longer receive
these extra gratuities.
Many arguments against every kind of pri-
mary egalitarianism (in particular resource or
welfare egalitarianism) criticize that the ideal
of equality has never been justiﬁed positively;
its defenders take it as natural or evident; its
critics just do not feel this. Egalitarianism is a
comparative ethics. Isn't this kind of always
making comparisons a repugnant character
trait, namely a fruit of envy, which cannot
bear that someone else is better oﬀ - instead of
sharing the other person’s pleasure? e most
radical consequence of this character trait is
levelling down, i.e. preferring that everybody
be equally badly oﬀ to only some people
being well oﬀ. Certiﬁcate egalitarianism is a
special kind of resource egalitarianism. How-
ever, the primary objects of a just distribution
should be primary, intrinsic goods and not
mere means like emission certiﬁcates because
a special distribution pattern of means may
lead to a completely diﬀerent distribution
pattern of primary goods.24 So an egalitarian
distribution of emission certiﬁcates does not
consider the welfare consequences of this dis-
tribution, neither does it consider special
needs in energy consumption, like heating in
high mountain regions or areas near the poles,
nor the economic impact on and economic
power of countries, in particular the curbing
eﬀect on developing countries.
A general problem with certiﬁcate egalitarian-
ism is that it is ﬁxated on one special problem.
Given the economic needs and aspirations of
developing countries, however, it seems to be
sure that a solution to the climate problem
can only be reached by also addressing the
issue of sustainable development.
Certiﬁcate egalitarianism is sometimes de-
fended as being favourable to developing
countries, and to a certain degree it does, in
fact, help the poorest countries. Yet, if that
ist considered a moral advantage, a more di-
rect way to express this particular concern
for the poor is prioritarianism; and generos-
ity can be better practiced through the
various forms of welfarism, which along
with progressive normativism have led to the
maxim NHDC. According to progressive
normativism, what is still more important,
however, than these principles and maxims
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Because we don’t think about future
generations, they will never forget us.
/ Henrik Tikkanen /
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is the great-hearted motivation itself to re-
duce one’s own GHG emissions and to
actively install strict reduction norms in
society.
Notes
1. Data from the National Energy Adminis-
tration of China, however, imply that since
2005 China has diminished the carbon in-
tensity of its economy (GCP 2008).
2. Kverndokk 1995, 130-131; 146
3. Lumer 2002.
4. Mabey et al. 1997, 380.
5. Sustainable reduction was morally opti-
mal according to utilitarian and prioritarian
evaluation criteria and morally required by a
sustainability criterion, Kantianism and the
no-harm criterion (Lumer 2002, 75, 78-80).
6. GCP 2008, Appendix.
7. ere may be few winners of global
warming, e.g. farmers in the northern USA,
southern Canada or some parts of Russia.
Of course, these people do not have any ra-
tional interest in stopping global warming.
However, these small fractions never sum up
to a nation's majority.
8. In 2000 the mean GHG emissions of
only about 25 of the poorest, mostly Afri-
can, countries were equal or below the sus-
tainable level of then about 1.5 t CO2
equivalent/capita (cf. WRI 2009).
9. Lumer 2002, 104.
10. A norm is vague if its content is not
completely clear; it is weak if it does not re-
quire costly actions.
11. However, on the basis of this weak norm
and for reasons of fairness as well as to en-
courage earlier eﬀorts, it may be right to re-
quire from those countries which did not
follow this norm that, in a global climate
agreement, they be obliged to make good for
this omission by stronger eﬀorts or by
receiving lower emission permits.
12. Mackie 1977, ch. 1.
13. In a more detailed and precise discus-
sion, it would be necessary to specify the
underlying welfare function. In such cases,
I endorse a special kind of prioritarianism
(Lumer 2006; 2000, ch. 7).
14. e name ‘progressive norm welfarism’
has been coined in analogy to names like
‘ideal rule utilitarianism’, where the ‘ism’ de-
notes the moral value function (welfarism),
the other noun denotes the kind of objects
that are central to the theory and that are
primarily valued (socially valid norms), and
the adjective gives some further speciﬁcation
(here: progressiveness, i.e. that the morally
justiﬁed socially valid norms shall be his-
torically more and more ambitious).
15. Suﬃcientarianism is the principle that
everybody should dispose of the necessary
resources at least at the suﬃciency level.
16. Leximin is a social preference order that
prefers the one of two states where the re-
spectively worst oﬀ is better oﬀ; if the worst
oﬀ persons in both states are equally bad oﬀ,
leximin prefers the state where the second
worst oﬀ is better oﬀ; etc.
17. Wirth/Lashoﬀ 1990 and Cline 1992.
18. E.g. Athanasiou/Baer 2002, 47 ﬀ.;
Ghosh 1993; Grübler/Fujii 1991; Meyer
2001, 56 ﬀ; Ott 2003, 196-197.; Page 2006,
177-179; Paterson 1996; Shue 1993;
Welsch 1993.
19. Smith 1993, 37-41.
20. den Elzen et al. 1993; Grübler/Fujii
1991; Grübler/Nakicenovic 1991.
21. Hyder 1992; Smith et al. 1993
22. Shukla 1990.
23. is justiﬁcation for excluding liability
does not hold for subjectively risky behavior,
such as pharmaceutical research, because
subjective risk can already establish liability.
CO2-emissions, however, were not even sub-
jectively risky before that date. And, of
course, that justiﬁcation does not exclude
historical debts generally but historical debts
from, according to the present scientiﬁc
knowledge, allegedly harmless actions.
24. is does not exclude that, for reasons
of practicability, theories of justice deter-
mine also diﬀerent secondary distribution
patterns for certain means, which are
expected to lead to the desired distribution
of primary goods. However, even welfare
egalitarianism, which determines just distri-
butions in terms of the primary object of
welfare, does not imply certiﬁcate egalitarian-
ism; only resource egalitarianism does,
which again speaks of secondary goods.
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Epistemic Uncertainties in Climate Predictions.
A Challenge for Practical Decision Making
by Prof. Dr. Dr. Rafaela Hillerbrand1
bstract: Most scientists agree that, at
least for the time being, unquanti-
ﬁed uncertainties are inevitably con-
nected to predictions of climate models.
Uncertainties, however, do not justify political
inaction. is paper addresses the question of
how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for
practical decision making. It is shown how
common decision approaches based on the pre-
cautionary principle fail to adequately deal
with uncertainties as they arise in climate mod-
eling. I argue that with regards to climate
change, unquantiﬁed uncertainties can neither
be ignored in decision making nor be reduced
to quantiﬁed ones by assigning subjective prob-
abilities. is distinguishes the ethical problems
associated with climate change from other prob-
lems regarding energy supply and demand like,
for example, those associated with nuclear
power.
Introduction
e uncertainty of climate predictions is dis-
cussed intensively within the scientiﬁc com-
munity – not only among climate sceptics.
However, uncertainties are often kept under
wraps when scientiﬁc ﬁndings are commu-
nicated to the public.2 It is not the scientists
who are to blame here. Rather the practical
debate seems incapable of adequately reﬂect-
ing uncertainties in modeling predictions. If
these uncertainties were communicated,
sound scientiﬁc research runs the risk of
being discredited as unscientiﬁc; the public
seems to prefer black and white instead of
the scientists' shades of grey. Often predic-
tions are taken either as correct and unques-
tionably reliable or simply as wrong.
However, most scientiﬁc models are neither
true, in the sense that they exactly predict
future events, nor simply wrong and use-
less.3 It is argued in this paper that in order
to incorporate aspects of inter- and intragen-
erational justice, practical decision making
has to carefully consider the shades of grey
A
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that aﬀect the reliability of climate models
in practical decision making.4
e focus here is not on the question of how
much, if any, reduction of greenhouse gases
is ethically legitimate,5 but rather on what
kind of decision making criteria should
guide our reasoning about this very que-
stion. e aim of the paper is twofold:
Firstly, I contend that some of the uncer-
tainties that practical decision making has to
consider cannot be quantiﬁed. Secondly, it is
argued that common decision making ap-
proaches based on the precautionary princi-
ple and expected utility maximisation fail to
adequately deal with unquantiﬁed uncer-
tainties and therefore are unable to incorpo-
rate issues of intergenerational or inter-
national justice.
e second section shows that any ethical
evaluation of greenhouse gas emissions has
to deal with epistemic uncertainties that
comprise, but go well beyond, what clima-
tologists refer to as uncertainty. Most pres-
sing for practical evaluations is the fact that
this auxiliar uncertainty is not quantiﬁed. I
argue in the third section that discerning
quantiﬁed and unquantiﬁed uncertainties is
relevant for practical decision making. e
fourth section contends that the precaution-
ary principle is not capable of adequately
implementing questions of fairness between
diﬀerent nations or generations. e ﬁfth
section sketches brieﬂy why, for the climate
debate, expected utility maximization does
not provide a more rational decision criteria
than the precautionary principle. As an out-
look, a way to modify expected utility
maximization in view of unquantiﬁed un-
certainties is adumbrated.
What is uncertain about climate predic-
tions?
Climate change raises serious problems re-
garding considerations of inter- and intrage-
nerational justice. is paper focuses on the
former and restricts itself to the ethical is-
sues associated with climate change insofar
as they are related to the distribution of wel-
fare across diﬀerent generations. Presup-
posing that our interest in the ethical aspects
of climate change arises mainly from consid-
erations of intergenerational justice, we may
assume that we value a certain ‘state of the
climate system’ only because of its value for
future generations. en a mere rise in glo-
bal mean temperature is not morally relevant
per se. What actually matters is how changes
in mean temperature or other climatic
variables inﬂuence the living conditions of
present and future human beings.6 Quite
often, however, the discussion is cut short
and moral conclusions are derived directly
from climate-model predictions, which
merely determine the state of the climate
system. Unless one assigns an absolute value
to the climate system, there is, however, no
a priori obligation to maintain the climate
system in a particular state. is preempting
of the moral debate is not only at variance
with sound decision making, it also adversely
aﬀects the science itself as scientiﬁc reason-
ing is, mostly implicitly, accused of being
but a political instrument for the wrong
side.7
e direct and indirect inﬂuences of climate
change on the expectancy and quality of
human life cannot be determined straight-
forwardly; hence so-called impact models
are used by (welfare) economists. e three-
fold distinction between a scenario, an
earth-scientiﬁc, and an economic level intro-
duced in ﬁgure 1 helps to clarify where and
how epistemic uncertainties arise and how
they enter the practical discourse.8 Only
some of the uncertainties in climate model-
ing (level two) may be quantiﬁed in a mean-
ingful way, e.g. in terms of the width of the
probability distribution of, say, a change in
global mean temperature. ese quantiﬁable
uncertainties mainly correspond to un-
known parameter ranges, while unquanti-
ﬁed uncertainties remain. is is particularly
(but not exclusively) because on the ﬁrst and
third level in ﬁgure 1 it is not known how
adequately the models used represent the re-
levant causal mechanisms of the modeled sy-
stem. is uncertainty in the model
conceptualization may be due to ﬁnite com-
putational power or due to our insuﬃcient
understanding of the modeled processes.
Note that in practice, the distribution of the
various tasks in determining the eﬀects of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is
not as clear-cut as suggested by ﬁgure 1, par-
ticularly when impact models mix with nor-
mative assessment. is is, on the one hand,
unavoidable and even necessary: Only a nor-
mative evaluation can determine which
aspects of human life are worth modeling.
Some modeling assumptions, like the dis-
counting rate of non-monetary losses, have
to be considered (also) on moral grounds.9
On the other hand, merging normative and
descriptive assessments blurs many (norma-
tive) assumptions and makes the evaluation
rather opaque.
e immediacy and practical relevance of
uncertainties
Why worry about epistemic problems when
reasoning about issues of inter- and intra-
generational justice? If uncertainty is a serious
problem, why not simply wait until climate
models and global and long-term economic
predictions have overcome their teething
troubles? e climate system only reacts very
slowly to changes in its parameters, such as
changes in carbon dioxide contraction.
Hence the atmospheric
concentration of persistent
greenhouse gases like carbon
dioxide can only be stabi-
lized by reducing emis-
sions.10 e large inertia of
the climate system necessita-
tes timely countermeasures.
Once particular eﬀects
occur, it may well be too late
for a systematic response.
Note again that this paper
deals with a sound discourse
about how to react to cli-
mate change, not with the
issue of correct reduction or
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Figure 1: ‘Estimating the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on human wellbeing.’
Short straight double arrows correspond to 'yields the output', long oblique thick arrows correspond
to ‘is input for’. e dotted rectangle indicates the combination of scientiﬁc prognoses that, as a
whole, serve as the empirical input for a political or moral evaluation on the last line.
mitigation strategies. e practical discourse
may or may not come to the conclusion that
instead of mitigating now, we should wait
and adapt later. However this decision can-
not wait for better and less uncertain pre-
dictions: it has to be taken now.
A need to address epistemic uncertainties in
practical debates can be deduced from three
(fairly weak) assumptions: Firstly, practical
decision making has to be based on the best
(empirical) knowledge available. Secondly,
practical problems related to environmental
issues can be formulated as scientiﬁc prob-
lems. irdly, science gives us the most reli-
able understanding of the natural world. I
do not want to justify these suppositions, as
all three seem to be both weak and rather in-
tuitive. From these epistemic and practical
assumptions it follows that we have to con-
sider epistemic uncertainties in practical
decision making: e best available infor-
mation that we have today is our scientiﬁc
forecasts plus information on their reliabil-
ity. ough the latter may not be expressed
or even be able to be expressed in numeric
terms, information on the quality of various
climate predictions is available.
If, for example, quantiﬁed uncertainties that
arise from insuﬃcient knowledge on the
input parameters were the only uncertainties
we had to deal with, common probabilistic
decision criteria like utility maximization
could be applied in a straightforward way.
Unquantiﬁed uncertainties, however, that
arise from insuﬃcient understanding of the
model conceptualization pose a severe prob-
lem. Quantitative ﬁgures may be mislead-
ing, but they can be communicated easily to
people outside one's own discipline. is is
not the same for errors and shortcomings
that are not quantiﬁed. Nonetheless, in esti-
mating the reliability of a physical or econom-
ic model there always remain unquantiﬁed
factors that are hard to communicate. For
example, the outputs of statistical analysis
will always depend on the speciﬁc experi-
mental paradigm in use, accepted practices,
and the general research experience within
the ﬁeld; these factors cannot be deﬁned ex-
plicitly, but must be learned by working in
the ﬁeld. In this way the scientiﬁc commu-
nity establishes a Wittgensteinian language
community.11 Even if scientists in a given
ﬁeld tend to assign ‘higher order beliefs’ that
express their conﬁdence in an underlying
theory, the methodology used, the researcher
or the group who carried out the work, etc,
these higher-order beliefs are only very rare-
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ly quantiﬁable themselves in terms of, say,
subjective probabilities.
e precautionary principle and justice as
fairness
When outcomes are highly uncertain, it is
often suggested that we fall back on the pre-
cautionary principle. e phrase precaution-
ary principle is fraught with ambiguity, so let
us brieﬂy explicate the term and its use with-
in ethical, juridical, and political contexts.
e Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, for example, formulates the
precautionary principle (rather vaguely) as
follows: “Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc
certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-eﬀective measures to pre-
vent environmental degradation.”12
In this weak formulation, the precautionary
principle provides no distinct directive for
practical decision making. Instead it consti-
tutes a meta-criterion stating that uncer-
tainties in scientiﬁc forecasts have to be
taken seriously. Strong formulations of the
precautionary principle constitute a genuine
decision criterion. e following is an ex-
ample of the precautionary principle in a
strong formulation: “Where an activity
raises threats of harm to the environment or
human health, precautionary measures
should be taken if some cause and eﬀect rela-
tionships are not fully established scientiﬁ-
cally [my italics].”13
Proponents of the precautionary principle
like C. Raﬀensberger and J. Tickner suggest
the following core idea behind all formula-
tions of the precautionary principle: “In its
simplest formulation, the precautionary
principle has a dual trigger: If there is a po-
tential for harm from an activity and if there
is uncertainty about the magnitude of im-
pacts or causality, then anticipatory action
should be taken to avoid harm.”14
In this paper, I want to understand the pre-
cautionary principle as a genuine decision
making criterion, that, loosely following
Gardiner,15 interprets the strong formulation
as a variant of the minimax rule in decision
theory: Minimize the maximally bad out-
come. Given certain assumptions about how
to quantify harm and wellbeing, this may be
reformulated as a maximin rule and reads
(for climate change): Maximize wellbeing in
those scenarios in which the involved hu-
mans are worst oﬀ (minimally beneﬁted), re-
gardless of how uncertain these scenarios are.
At ﬁrst glance, a precautionary approach
seems well suited to avoiding an ethically
unjustiﬁable discounting of future damage
caused by our present greenhouse gas emis-
sions: We cannot exclude with certainty the
possibility that the release of greenhouse
gases has the potential to cause severe harm
to future generations, hence emissions of
greenhouse gases ought to be abandoned. A
precautionary approach seems adequate
when the stakes are high – the living condi-
tions of all future humans may be endan-
gered by severe climatic changes. Furthermore,
some economic assessments suggest that re-
ducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions is not very costly.16 Following Stern,17
a commitment of only 1 percent of global
gross domestic product (GDP) is needed to
avoid the major hazards that may arise from
climate change. At ﬁrst blush, this appears
very aﬀordable; but if we base our calcula-
tion on current GDP value, it amounts to
an investment of US $ 450 billion per year.
For comparison: the current estimates of the
money needed to provide 80 percent of rural
populations in Africa with access to water
and sanitation by 2015 amounts to US $ 1.3
billion per annum.18 Clearly, societies (or
other organisations) are able to part with
only a certain amount of money or other re-
sources for altruistic endeavours, and the miti-
gation of major changes in future climate is
only one such endeavour.19 Investing in the
mitigation of climate-change eﬀects means
forgoing other investments which we have a
moral obligation to make. One central re-
quirement of the practical debate is a deci-
sion about which investment has priority
over others. Presupposing an answer to this
question from the very beginning of the de-
bate – for example by assuming that climate
change is currently humanity’s most pressing
problem – pre-empts the moral debate, as
discussed in section 2. Applying the precau-
tionary principle to global warming as a sin-
gular problem thus does not allow us to
adequately deal with the valid claims of
groups that are adversely aﬀected by natural
or societal ‘disasters’ other than climate
change. is approach is clearly incapable of
adequately incorporating considerations of
inter- or intragenerational justice as it does
not address the question of why suﬀering
arising from climate change has priority over
suﬀering caused by other sources. e cri-
tique raised here, however, is not a charge
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against the precautionary principle itself; it
only disqualiﬁes common applications of
the precautionary principle.
Suppose that one can show that – given cer-
tain ethical standards, which are not under
debate here – the worst-case scenario regard-
ing the eﬀects of climate change is that these
eﬀects are worse than any other type of
human suﬀering, present and future. is
means that if our (possibly very unrealistic)
assumptions are indeed correct, then follow-
ing the precautionary principle, we have to
mitigate climate change at any cost. We are
trading the certain suﬀering of people living
presently against a possibly more severe, but
yet uncertain suﬀering of people living in
the future. If the worst-case scenario is as un-
certain as currently estimated for global warm-
ing, and is balanced against certain other
scenarios whose bad eﬀects are certain (like
the actual suﬀering of many people in third
word countries, for example), it is unreason-
able to completely mask all other scenarios
and focus on mitigation of the uncertain,
but worst outcome.20 As noted above, the
available information on the eﬀects of an-
thropogenic global warming includes infor-
mation about the ‘likelihood’ of the
worst-case and other scenarios. is infor-
mation is not quantiﬁed and may not be
fully quantiﬁable at all. However, we do
have information that suggests that, while
present suﬀering is certain, future suﬀering
caused by global warming is uncertain.
Good arguments for neglecting this infor-
mation should be given. But to the best of
the author's knowledge, no such arguments
have been presented tin the literature.
Problems with a precautionary approach as
an action guiding principle have been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature.21 is
paper only addresses one central issue of im-
portance in any intergenerational ethics,
namely how to balance obligations towards
future generations against obligations to-
wards people living presently. Even if one ar-
gues for the ethical legitimacy of trade-oﬀs
between losses and gains experienced by dif-
ferent people one cannot deny that presently
living people have a right to safe water and
suﬃcient nutrition. One needs to argue at
least that uncertain future losses are worse
than current suﬀering. But a mere precau-
tionary approach to global warming is
incapable of simultaneously incorporating
considerations of inter- and intrageneratio-
nal justice.
A modiﬁed expected utility approach for
a greener future
e precautionary principle is often perceived
as the opposite e of maximizing expected uti-
lity: Instead of focusing on the worst case sce-
nario, the latter considers all possible outcomes
and the associated utilities , weighted by
their occurrence probability , or, to put it
in more technical terms: We are to maximize
and sum over all possible scenarios. e ex-
treme scenarios of run-away climate change
or very little temperature change, for example,
are thus taken into account, as is the sce-
nario in which the temperature change
exactly equals the estimated mean value. e
latter scenario being the most probable, is
given the greatest weight.
Maximizing the expected utility is an adap-
tation of the utilitarian maxim of the greatest
good for the greatest number to decisions
under uncertainty: It is not the overall utility
(or ‘good’) that is to be maximized, but the
expected utility, i.e. the sum of diﬀerent util-
ities weighted by their probability of occur-
rence. e assignment of utilities to possible
climate-change eﬀects raises many diﬃcult
problems, but I do not want to dwell on
these problems here. ese problems are not
speciﬁc to decision making under uncer-
tainty and related problems of welfare-based
ethics. Note, in particular, that problems
about determining the utility of an event, or
deciding what utility actually amounts to,
parallel to some extend a problem of the pre-
cautionary approach, i.e. to decide as to how
to actually determine the worst-case sce-
nario.22 As this paper’s focus is on uncer-
tainties (of expected utility and of the
worst-case scenario), the problems associa-
ted with measuring human welfare and how
to equate it with utilities are not discussed
here. For the purposes of this paper it suﬃ-
ces to assume that the impact on human
welfare estimated in economic models on
level three in ﬁgure 1 can be associated with
(intersubjective) utilities in a meaningful
way.23
In order to apply the principle that tells us to
maximize expected utility to global warm-
ing, all (morally) relevant eﬀects of green-
house gas emissions have to be assigned
some probability . As there are no fre-
quency estimates for most of these eﬀects,
one may fall back on a Bayesian account, i.e.
via subjective probabilities, the reliability of
scientiﬁc outcomes is quantiﬁed. e dis-
tinction between quantiﬁed and unquanti-
ﬁed uncertainties thus becomes obsolete.
at is rather brief, so let us dilate somewhat
on the problem here: Our most successful
method for tackling uncertainty has been to
regiment situations of uncertainty by the use
of probabilistic propositions. But unless one
is a certain kind of subjectivist about prob-
ability, one wishes that one’s probabilistic be-
liefs are constrained by objective facts, so
that they approximate to objective variables,
whether one takes the latter to be frequen-
cies, propensities, or some other concept.
As argued above and elsewhere,24 there is no
reliable basis for assigning probabilities to
the empirical inputs needed for practical as-
sessment. Unquantiﬁed uncertainties are of
central relevance when we are discussing cli-
mate-change issues. is distinguishes the
threat of global warming from other ethical
problems related to energy supply and de-
mand, such as safety issues of nuclear power
plants, or ﬁnal disposal site, where there is a
reliable basis of assigning probabilities. Not
only is it impossible to choose meaningful
prior probabilities, but due to the large time
scales in which the climate system reacts to
changes, there is also insuﬃcient data for up-
dating these probabilities. e Bayesian meth-
od of assigning subjective probabilities via
prior guesses therefore fails in the case of cli-
mate change.
Another way to assign subjective probabil-
ities is to use Laplace’s principle of insuﬃ-
cient reason: All possible eﬀects are taken as
equally probable. is approach, which was
employed, for example, by Harsanyi,25 is at
fault for neglecting available empirical in-
formation (as is the precautionary ap-
proach). ere is no logical superiority of
Harsanyi’s assumption of equiprobability
over Rawls' focus on the worst outcome as,
per se, there is no logical need to assign sub-
jective probabilities to uncertain decision
outcomes on the basis of Harsanyi’s equi-
probability assumption. We do have infor-
mation – albeit not fully quantiﬁed – about
the likelihood of certain eﬀects of climate
change. Hence, even when we leave prob-
lems associated with assigning meaningful
utilities to the impacts of various energy sce-
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narios aside, climate change cannot be trea-
ted by expected utility maximization. is is
unfortunate as maximizing expected utility
has one clear advantage over a precautionary
approach: By incorporating an inter-tempo-
ral as well as an international perspective,
maximizing expected utility is, by its very
nature, able to trade-oﬀ the costs and bene-
ﬁts of diﬀerent people living at diﬀerent
places and times.
e lack of (subjective) probabilities in the
sense deﬁned above does not imply, how-
ever, that one has to fall back on to non-
probabilistic decision criteria such as the
precautionary approach. is paper’s propo-
sition should not be misunderstood as a
kind of reformulation of the precautionary
principle in its weak form, i.e. ‘Take uncer-
tainties seriously and therefore address also
the uncertain outcomes’. If anything, the
paper aimed to argue that uncertain eﬀects
are not to be (mis)taken as certain ones,
which seriously undermines the use of the
precautionary principle.
In the literature decision methods are sug-
gested, which parallel expected utility max-
imization, to cope with the lack of reliable
prior probabilities and information about
how to update these priors on the basis of
the conditional probability calculus.26 An
adequate decision procedure for global war-
ming would assign meaningful utilities to
various outcomes in a ﬁrst step by political
decision makers, moral philosophers and oth-
ers. As to the occurrence of unquantiﬁed un-
certainties, however, the second step, the
actual cost-beneﬁt analysis (understood in a
broad sense), should be conducted by ex-
perts on the empirical forecasts. Such a blue
print can only work when, though philo-
sophical ethics may not aim at a detailed
casuistic, it does not shy away from context-
variant information on the very decision.
e 1970s debate on the ‘rationality’ of ex-
pected utility maximization or maximin,
whose main protagonists were Harsanyi and
Rawls, was only able to show that answering
the question of whether the precautionary
principle or expected utility maximization is
adequate has to, willy-nilly, implement con-
text-variant features of the decision situa-
tion. Note that this paper argues against the
precautionary principle only when applied
to global warming. e given arguments do
not discredit this principle as a decision-ma-
king criteria in itself.
Concerning an adequate decision-making
approach to global warming, this paper has,
so far, turned a blind eye to factors that ac-
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tually precede the debate on whether the
precautionary approach or expected utility
measures seem most adequate. So, conclud-
ing this paper, let me brieﬂy discuss this prob-
lem: Before being able to actually talk about
uncertain outcomes of the decision whether
to try to reduce greenhouse gases, we have
to decide what this decision is actually about
– is it about the welfare of future humans?;
do we need to discuss the pros and cons of
alternative energy supplies that do not emit
greenhouse gases as well?, etc. Any analysis
of a speciﬁc decision must start with some
delimitation of the decision itself. It is not
always well established how to determine the
‘decision horizon’.27 e scope of the deci-
sion, or even which problem the decision is
supposed to solve might be unclear. e
further in time the consequences of our de-
cisions lie, the more diﬃcult it is to deter-
mine the decision horizon. For example, on
moral grounds diﬀerent people are not to be
treated in a diﬀerent way, but we cannot
simply be all treated in the same way. Cur-
rently, the decision horizon is set by prag-
matic considerations, though, particularly in
intergenerational ethics, it is of central rele-
vance. As for how to determine the scope of
a decision, whether it be about climate
change issues or other issues, this should be
a topic for the empirical sciences, only inso-
far as these determine limits to our
knowledge. It remains a genuine task for eth-
ics that philosophers should not shy away
from, because this task requires dwelling in
detail, on the context of the decision-mak-
ing situation.
Notes:
1. I would like to thank Steve Clarke, Mar-
tin Peterson, Andreas Pfennig, Nicholas
Shackel, and Hartmut Westermann for help-
ful discussions on the topic of this paper as
well as criticism and comments on earlier
versions. I thank Till Spieker for help in ﬁ-
nalizing the paper.
2. Compare, for example, the full IPCC
report and its summary for policy makers:
Solomon et al. 2007.
3. Giere 2004.
4. ough moral uncertainties are indisput-
ably a big concern in an intergenerational
ethics, this paper focus on epistemic uncer-
tainties only.
5. erefore compare, for example, Gardi-
ner 2006a, Hanson/Johannesson 1997,
Lumer 2002.
6. Note in this context that the anthropo-
centric approach pursued in this paper can
be extended straightforwardly to incorporate
other sentient beings as well.
7. Compare Oreskes 2004 and Pielke 2004
on the heated debate that followed the pub-
lication of B. Lomborg's book e Sceptical
Environmentalist in 2001.
8. Hillerbrand/Ghil 2008.
9. Stern 2007.
10. Solomon et al. 2007.
11. Wittgenstein 2001, 10.
12. UNEP 1992; UNFCC 1998.
13. Apart from the two versions discussed in
this paper, various other formulations of the
precautionary principle exist: Sandin et al.
2002, O’Riordan/Jordan.
14. Raﬀensberger/Tickner 1999, 1. 15.
Gardiner 2006b.
16. Note that there is considerable disagree-
ment within the economic community on
the costs of reducing greenhouse gases,see
the response of Weitzmann 2009 and Nord-
haus 2008 to Stern 2007.
17. Stern 2007.
18. Martinez Austria/van Hofwegen (eds.)
2006.
19. Note that the assumption of one well-
deﬁned decision maker that underlies the
debates on climate change and is adopted
here is unrealistic.
20. Note that this argumentation needs re-
ﬁnement when the worst-case outcome is a
singular event like the end of human life on
Earth (c.p. Ord/Hillerbrand/Sandberg
2009). e current empirical knowledge,
however, seems to exclude that climate
change is of this very nature.
21. Peterson 2006, Clarke 2005, and ref-
erences therein.
22.e problem of the precautionary ap-
proach is somehow easier, as it needs only an
ordinal concept of wellbeing, while EUT
presupposes a cardinal welfare measure. Car-
dinal and ordinal measures can only identi-
cal when the welfare function already fulﬁlls
certain restraints Neuman/Morgenstern
1967.23. How to actually assign meaning-
ful utilities has been discussed extensively in
the literature. For an intergenerational ethics
it raises rampant problems, see Lumer 2002
for a discussion as to how assign utilities in
the context of climate change.
24. Frame et al. 2007.
25. Harsanyi 1975, 1982.
26. For example Shafer 1990.
27. Hansson 1996, 371.
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Just Adaptation? How the Diffusion of Norms in the Global
Climate Regime Affects International Climate Politics
by Delf Rothe, M.A.
bstract: Politics in the international
climate regime is a balancing act be-
tween intra- and intergenerational
justice, as it has to account for both the needs
of developing countries and those of future gen-
erations. Following a constructivist approach,
this paper argues that international climate
politics are heavily dependent upon the way cli-
mate change and the appropriate behavior re-
quired to prevent it are constructed collectively.
e article shows how the diﬀusion of norms
and changing images of climate change have
shifted the interests of the actors under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
As a result, adaptation became more and more
widely accepted as a necessary step in interna-
tional climate politics in advancing the stra-
tegy of climate change avoidance. is also
represents a shift from a focus on intergen-
erational justice as the main normative goal of
the convention, to a broader aim of sustainable
development that comprises both inter- and
intragenerational justice.
Introduction
For mankind, adaptation to changing cli-
matic conditions is nothing new. At any
given point in history, people have been
forced to adapt to changing climatic condi-
tions. In the face of anthropogenic climate
change however, adaptation takes on a new
ethical as well as political signiﬁcance. As
scientiﬁc modeling has developed which al-
lows the prediction of future climatic de-
velopments, adaptation can be undertaken
anticipatorily – and hence alongside mitiga-
tion may be a complementary strategy to
promote intergenerational justice in the face
of climate change. Yet, because most of the
regions suﬀering from the impacts of global
warming lie in developing countries, but it is
the industrialized states that bear the main
responsibility for the origins of these
changes, adaptation is also an issue of inter-
national politics and international justice.
us adaptation is seen today as “a necessary
strategy at all scales to complement climate
change mitigation eﬀorts.”1
is development is mirrored in the politi-
cal development of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Until 2001 adaptation did not play any sig-
niﬁcant role in the convention. It was rather
seen as a hindrance of climate policy and
stood contrary to the sustainability norms
that were constitutive of the regime. e
preservation of natural systems for future ge-
nerations was the main goal of the conven-
tion as it was formulated at the UN
Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED). On the contrary, the pro-
motion of adaptation measures was seen as a
form of resignation and a turn away from a
policy of preserving the present state of the
ecosystems. Yet from 2001 on, beginning
with the seventh Conference of the Parties
(COP) in Marrakesh, adaptation played a
major part at every annual UN climate sum-
mit.
From a conventional or rationalist perspec-
tive in International Relations this develop-
ment of the climate regime is puzzling. If we
were to assume the purely utility-max-
imizing behavior of states as the main actors
in international climate politics, we would
not be able to explain why they should
voluntarily engage in adaptation projects
that do not in large part beneﬁt them. Yet
by taking a social constructivist perspective,
we can show that the growing role of adap-
tation was the result of a learning process in
the climate regime that shifted the collective
perceptions and norms in the climate
change discourse. us, a narrative of cli-
mate change focused on the physical and
ecological that was dominant at the time of
the creation of the regime, was gradually re-
placed by a narrative that stressed the region-
ally speciﬁc social implications of climate
change. On an ethical level this represents
the shift from intergenerational justice to
international justice as the main normative
paradigm in international climate politics.
e challenge of constructivism in inter-
national relations theory
Constructivist approaches in the ﬁeld of
International Relations (IR) developed as a
critique of the dominant theories in IR –
Realism and Liberalism.2 Although there are
many diﬀerent versions of constructivism,
all share the same basic idea: the social con-
struction of reality. While the existence of an
objective reality is not put into question, it
is assumed that humans are not able to per-
ceive that reality directly. Rather, objects in
the ‘real world’ gain their meaning through
the process of human interaction and com-
munication. us, the interests of political
actors cannot be regarded as ﬁxed and given,
but depend on the actors self-image, the col-
lectively shared views of the problem or issue
at stake (causal ideas) and conceptions of ap-
propriate behavior (behavioral norms).3 Ac-
tors therefore are seen as homini sociologici
rather than as homo oeconomici. In certain
situations they do not act in a way that max-
imizes their personal gains, but rather in the
way they think is appropriate for the respec-
tive situation.4
Applied to international climate politics this
means that neither do the material charac-
teristics of global climate change determine
politics in the climate regime, nor do the in-
terests of the actors in the regime exist inde-
pendently of the ideas and norms of the
dominant climate discourses. Rather, it is a
particular construction – or narrative – of
climate change that decides which policies
are chosen. Furthermore, the conduct of ac-
tors in the climate regime depends heavily
on their notions of themselves (e.g. as cli-
mate political pioneers or as a victim of cli-
mate change). Norms in climate politics, as
derived from ethical principles like inter-
and intragenerational justice do not simply
exist; they are invented and promoted in
ethical discourses by inﬂuential actors like
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) or the World Commission
on Environment and Development (WCED).
Inter- versus intragenerational justice
In postulating a shift from inter- to intra-
generational justice, this work will ﬁrst clarify
the meaning of those concepts as well as
their relation to each other. e concept of
intergenerational justice refers to the obliga-
tion of the present generation to enable the
members of successive generations to satisfy
their basic needs in the same way, or in some
better way, than themselves.5 Intergenera-
tional justice in this respect does not only
A
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mean the preservation of natural resources
but refers to all resources (material and ideal)
that may promote human well-being. When
it comes to the political realization of inter-
generational justice, there is one central prob-
lem: the short-term orientation of the
democratic process. Future members of so-
ciety do not have any voice in the system,
and are thus not represented by present de-
cision-makers.
Intragenerational justice on the contrary, re-
fers to the social inequality within national
societies or between diﬀerent states at a global
level (international- or north-south-justice).
While in the case of intergenerational justice
a certain generation is conceptualized as a sin-
gle average individual, in the case of intra-
generational justice the diﬀerences between
the diﬀerent living conditions within a gen-
eration are highlighted. Contrary to inter-
generational justice, conﬂicting goals in
intragenerational justice can be resolved
through direct negotiations or judicial pro-
ceedings. Moreover, it is possible to directly
increase intragenerational justice through
distributive measures which may also have
positive eﬀects on intergenerational justice,
if the future beneﬁt of the disadvantaged
outweighs the predictable deﬁcit of the ad-
vantaged, i.e. the net-eﬀect in the future is
positive.6
Ethical implications of mitigation and
adaptation
Unmitigated anthropogenic climate change
poses a threat to intergenerational justice di-
rectly and indirectly. Firstly, it threatens to
destroy signiﬁcant amounts of the earth’s
natural capital (a clean atmosphere, ecosys-
tems, biodiversity etc.). Secondly, there will
be impacts such as extreme weather events
that threaten human-security and well-being
of future generations. Yet, while the direct
eﬀects of climate change will hit future gen-
erations as a whole, impacts on human-se-
curity will remain unequally distributed
between future peoples in the industrialized
world and the developing countries.
When it comes to alternatives to deal with
these problems politically, there are two gen-
eral strategies: mitigation and adaptation.
Whereas the former means an abatement or
prevention of dangerous climate change
through the reduction of CO2-emissions,
the latter refers to the anticipatory and plan-
ned modiﬁcation of human practices to ac-
commodate climate changes. From a purely
intergenerational point of view, mitigation
can be regarded as the normatively superior
strategy as it guarantees both natural preser-
vation (and is thus compatible with a strict
notion of ecological sustainability) and the
chances of future generations as a whole to
satisfy their basic needs.7 Adaptation policies
on the contrary also have the potential to in-
crease intergenerational justice, when they
have a positive net-eﬀect in the future. Yet
this potential is rather limited, as the eco-
logical losses caused by climate change will
have to be accepted in most cases. Moreover,
as most adaptation has to be undertaken lo-
cally, it will not beneﬁt future generations in
their entireties.
By adopting the perspective of intragenera-
tional justice when analyzing international
politics however, we get a slightly diﬀerent
picture. is position was especially adopt-
ed by developing countries in the 1990s,
leading to a general skepticism among deve-
loping countries regarding climate politics.
At the global level, mitigation policies are
potentially inconsistent with notions of
international justice. is is because indus-
trialized and developing countries have thus
far made unequal contributions to the global
amount of greenhouse-gas emissions. is
led for example to the implementation of
the ‘polluter pays principle’ in the ﬁrst round
of the Kyoto Protocol, and the search for a
fair allocation mechanism for the next round
(post 2012).8
International adaptation policies, on the
contrary, are normatively rooted in a dis-
course of international justice. As the indus-
trialized states bear the main responsibility
for climate change, but developing countries
will exorbitantly suﬀer from its impacts, a
normative imperative can be derived for the
north to ﬁnance necessary adaptation projects
in the south.9 Following this argumentation,
advanced for example by developmental
NGOs, ﬁnancing adaptation is an appro-
priate measure to guarantee a sustainable de-
velopment of vulnerable countries in the
face of what is, to some extent, unavoidable
climate change.
International climate politics between
mitigation and adaptation
e years following the creation of the
international climate regime at the UNCED
in 1992 were characterized by intense nego-
tiations over an international agreement on
mandatory emission reduction targets (the
Kyoto process). Due to the opposing posi-
tions of European Community (EC) mem-
ber states, climate skeptics like the USA or
Japan, and the developing countries, the ne-
gotiations proved to be very diﬃcult. While
there had been some agreement on an abso-
lute reduction target for industrialized coun-
tries at the 1997 COP-3 meeting in Kyoto,
it was ultimately not until 2000 during the
second part of the COP-6 meeting in Bonn
that the agreement was concluded.10
In the beginning of the Kyoto process the
issue of adaption played a minor role, but
this changed with the seventh COP confer-
ence in Marrakesh, in 2001.11 e Marra-
kesh Accords initialized an international
program to support the developing countries
with adaptation measures. For this purpose,
three funds for the ﬁnancing of projects in
the south were established. Less developed
countries were engaged through National
Adaptation Strategies (NAPAs) under the
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Table 1: Important steps in international climate governance
UNFCCC. Alongside the funding of adap-
tion projects the UNFCCC also focused on
the development and distribution of scientif-
ic knowledge, providing the most vulnerable
regions and countries with the means to im-
prove their adaptation eﬀorts. Moreover,
best practice projects should serve as guide-
lines for policy-makers in vulnerable regions
and countries. To this end the UNFCCC
adopted the Buenos Aires Working Program
on Adaptation and Response Measures in
2004 and the Nairobi Work Programme on
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to
Climate Change in 2006.12
Cognitive change as social learning
When we look into the reasons for the grow-
ing importance of adaptation, one could
simply point to the fact that scientiﬁc cer-
tainty about future climate change has risen.
is could have brought decision-makers to
the insight that they would be better oﬀ if
they look after themselves and thus prevent
work on adaptation. Yet from a social con-
structivist point of view this is clearly only
half of the story, as it does not account for
the political process that led to more exact
scientiﬁc insights. e UNFCCC itself is
the necessary condition for this learning pro-
cess through interaction. e invention and
dispersion of new understandings of climate
change was made possible through the stable
framework of international climate negotia-
tions.
ree mechanisms can be identiﬁed that
were inﬂuential in this development. First,
the annual meetings of the member-states
guaranteed continuous interaction.13 Sec-
ond, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) was integrated into
the climate regime as a major scientiﬁc body.
is enabled a steady exchange between cli-
mate scientists and diplomats.14 ird, the
members of the convention obliged them-
selves to regularly report about their activi-
ties in the ﬁeld of climate politics (so called
national communications).15 All of this
guaranteed an environment in which new
understandings could evolve (and through
the publications of the IPCC most funda-
mentally) and become collectively accepted
through intensive interaction.
Climate change as a global and ecological
problem
When the climate regime was born in 1992,
there was already an internationally estab-
lished and accepted discourse or narrative
about climate change that could be called a
102
global-physical climate narrative. is dis-
course was the result of an ongoing inter-
national scientiﬁc interaction at a variety of
conferences held under the auspices of the
UN and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation (WMO). The discourse thus com-
prised the collective ideas about climate
change that had been accepted by the vast
majority of the scientiﬁc community at that
time. rough the publication of the ﬁrst
assessment-report of the IPCC in 1990, this
narrative had already been dispersed in the
political arena of the UNFCCC.
In this dominant discourse climate change
was depicted as a global problem: causes of
climate change were identiﬁed with the sum
of total global emissions, and the impacts
were perceived as global in scale (e.g. sea
level rise).16 Furthermore it was clear that the
scientiﬁc facts about the exact development
and future impacts of climate change
remained uncertain.17 Nonetheless, the
insight that climate change was the result of
greenhouse-gas emissions can be regarded as
having been collectively accepted in the do-
minant climate discourse.18 Climate change
was generally framed in terms of the natural
sciences, which suppressed other, more
socially orientated, interpretations. In terms
of societal impact this meant that climate
change was primarily perceived as an
environmental problem, and to a lesser ex-
tent a social or economic one.19
Table 2: Elements of a global-physical narra-
tive.
e general conception of climate change
had some serious implications for the col-
lective ideas about adaptation to climate
change. As climate change was primarily re-
garded as a problem for the future environ-
ment, the duty of policymakers was to avert
it. In this context, adaptation was not seen as
a desirable option in climate politics but ra-
ther as capitulation.20 While climate change
was seen as a global problem, the problem
of adaptation was perceived to be a local
one, as the impacts of global warming vary
greatly from place to place. It was considered
doubtful to predict impacts at a local level
so that anticipatory adaptation appeared ir-
rational.21 e construction of the accepted
conception of climate change in physical
terms led to the collective belief that adap-
tive capacity is an intrinsic feature of region-
al ecosystems, rather than a function of
socio-economic conditions that could be po-
litically modiﬁed. Finally, and following
from this, adaptation was widely interpreted
as being part of the expected costs of global
warming.22
Climate change as a regional and social
problem
From 2001 onwards, there were a number
of considerable changes in the discourse on
climate change in the UNFCCC. Probably
the most important change was the growing
evidence of the occurrence of climate
change.23 Furthermore, the spatial percep-
tion of global warming seems to have
changed. e main reason for this was the
development of new regional climate models
that are far more precise and allow for accu-
rate predictions at a regional level. is led
to the realization that the perception of cli-
mate change as a global problem does not
adequately account for its local impacts.24
Moreover, the focus is no longer on the ef-
fects of global warming upon certain ecosys-
tems but on the vulnerability of certain
regions and communities. is leads us to
another shift in the perception of climate
change: it is not illustrated in purely physi-
cal terms anymore, instead it is portrayed –
at least with respect to its impacts – in its
socio-economic context.25
e changes in the collective perception of
climate change also alter the image of adap-
tation in the context of international climate
politics. e problem of climate change now
appears to be a secure scientiﬁc fact. More
exact regional climate models show that the
least developed parts of the world, who have
contributed the least to the greenhouse ef-
fect, will likely suﬀer the most from its ef-
fects. is has also led to the collective
perception of contemporary weather ex-
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tremes as being the ﬁrst signiﬁcant visible
consequences of climate change. rough
this development the discourse of climate
politics engages with the discourse of deve-
lopment politics and/or sustainable deve-
lopment. Adaptation and mitigation are no
longer perceived as excluding each other, but
as complementary strands of an interna-
tional climate political strategy.26
e evolution of norms in international
climate politics
When the UNFCCC was initialized three
dominant climate political norms in the
international arena had already been estab-
lished. e ﬁrst norm resulted from years of
ongoing international scientiﬁc cooperation
and from a collective interpretation of cli-
mate change as a global problem. It can be
formulated as follows: the problem of cli-
mate change should be solved by the inter-
national community in a cooperative
manner.27 e two other predominant cli-
mate norms derived from an international
discourse on sustainability initiated by the
Club of Rome in the 1970s, and politically
enforced by the Report of the WCED in
1987.28
e ﬁrst of these norms translates the impli-
cations of an intergenerational ethics into a
behavioral norm for climate politics, arguing
that eﬀorts to mitigate climate change
should be undertaken in spite of deﬁnite
scientiﬁc facts (i.e. precautionary princi-
ple).29 As global warming poses a threat for
the well-being of future generations, insuﬃ-
cient scientiﬁc certainty must not be allowed
to result in political inactivity. e second
sustainability-norm reﬂects, in contrast to
the ﬁrst, a concept of international justice:
because industrialized countries bear the
largest share of responsibility for climate
change, they should take the lead in climate
politics (i.e. the polluter pays principle).30
e WCED can be regarded as the initiator
of these two sustainability norms in the cli-
mate regime, as it as it was the one organi-
zation with the authority and legitimacy
necessary to successfully promote these
norms internationally. With the formulation
of the UNFCCC treaty these three climate
norms were collectively accepted and were
made international law.31
e growing importance of adaptation was
not the result of a displacement of these cli-
mate norms by newly established ones. Ra-
ther, the concrete meaning of the norms
described above changed and was extended
against the background of the changing cli-
mate discourse. In the cognitive context of
1992, the primary normative imperative in
climate politics was to abandon or avert cli-
mate change.32 is can logically be derived
as follows. Global warming poses a threat to
the environment and to future generations,
thus, climate change should be averted. In
order to do so, global emissions should be
reduced in absence of absolute certainty, and
that due to their historical debt industrial-
ized countries should take the lead in doing
so. In other words, this logic means that ac-
cording to a global-physical narrative, a
strict concept of ecological sustainability
leads to the normative superiority of mitiga-
tion over adaptation.
However, the more the cognitive context in
climate politics has shifted towards a region-
al-social narrative, the more the normative
judgment of adaptation changed. is can
also be explained logically, as follows. Cli-
mate change poses a threat to existing and
future generations especially in poor coun-
tries. e industrialized countries are re-
sponsible for the main part of climate
change. erefore, developing countries
should be supported by developed nations
in their eﬀorts at adaptation to climate
change, and adaptation should be under-
taken in an anticipatory fashion. On an ethi-
cal level, this development reveals a
normative shift away from a rather strict
conception of sustainability, to a more so-
cially oriented conception in which interna-
tional justice is advanced, and increasingly
serves as a driving factor in climate politics.
To guarantee sustainable development, it is
no longer seen as suﬃcient to free develop-
ing countries from obligations in the climate
regime. Instead, they must actively be
supported.
Polluters, non-polluters and victims in the
climate regime
Including adaptation as a part of global cli-
mate governance however, is not simply the
result of altruistic behavior on the part of the
industrialized countries within the norma-
tive context described above. Rather, the
process through which these cognitive
changes took place went hand in hand with
the alteration of some of the actors’ identi-
ties, and thus their very interests. Most im-
portant in this respect was the development
of a collective identity among the most vul-
nerable countries. At the beginning of inter-
national climate negotiations, most of the
developing countries saw themselves as not
being truly involved in questions of climate
change. From the point of view of interna-
tional justice, they did not feel responsible
for the fate of future generations. is re-
sulted from the fact that there were two
distinct role models in international climate
politics, the polluters (the industrialized
countries) and the non-polluters (the develop-
ing countries).33 ere was only a small
group of small island states (AOSIS) that un-
derstood themselves to be threatened by glo-
bal warming. rough the process of
interaction in the ongoing climate regime
negotiations, this constellation of roles
began to change. First, the changing climate
discourse led to the insight on the part of
many developing countries that their socio-
economic and/or geographic situation made
them particularly vulnerable. Second, deve-
loping nations began to take the communi-
cative signals of the polluters in the climate
negotiations into account. Although the
latter had obliged themselves to prevent cli-
mate change, they either expressed their un-
willingness publicly (as in the case of the
‘climate skeptics’) or they failed to reach
their reduction targets (like some states of
the European Union).34
As a result, the developing countries began
to share a notion of a common fate in facing
the threats of climate change: they did not
see themselves as non-polluters anymore, but
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Table 3: Elements of a regional-social climate discourse.
rather as victims. e changing collective
identity of the developing countries thereby
led to the alteration of their very interests.
From their self-image as victims, they drew
power for arguments in favor of compensa-
tion and support in the process of adapta-
tion. eir collective identity serves as a
fastener, allowing them to develop a com-
mon position in the negotiations and there-
by add authority to their accounts. us, the
growing presence of adaptation issues in the
UNFCCC can be explained by more ex-
plicit claims for compensation by develop-
ing countries.35
us, under a global-physical climate dis-
course the perspective of intergenerational jus-
tice was normatively forwarded in the
international climate regime by some of the
industrialized countries (the EC member-
states). In that context, the developing coun-
tries had no incentive to participate in
international climate politics and relied on ar-
guments of international justice to justify this.
Yet, from the same standpoint, under a re-
gional-social climate discourse, they actively
developed claims in international climate gov-
ernance. Whereas under a global-physical
discourse the suﬀerers (future generations)
were anonymous and had no direct voice in
the negotiation process, the suﬀerers under
a regional-social perspective are actively en-
gaged in the negotiations.
Conclusion
is article has shown that the growing im-
portance of adaptation as an international
climate political strategy can be explained by
a learning process which has taken place with-
in the climate regulation regime. Scientiﬁc
and political interaction led to the shift from
a global-physical to a regional-social narra-
tive on climate change. We have further seen
that the political implications of ethical
principles such as inter- and intrageneration-
al justice depend heavily on the discursive
context of the political issue-area. Under a
global-physical narrative, the intergeneration-
al implications of climate justice were for-
warded within the climate regime, while
international justice was mainly invoked by
developing countries to contest their own
participation in a global mitigation scheme.
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A regional-social discourse however, has led
to a more prominent and active role for
international justice arguments in climate
politics, allowing them to become a driving
factor in the push for a combined political
strategy of mitigation and adaptation. A so-
cial constructivist analysis of this transition
shows that the interests of actors in the cli-
mate regime are not independent of their
surrounding beliefs and the context that in-
ﬂuences their very identities. e self-image
of developing countries changed as they
began to realize that they will have to bear
most of the negative consequences of cli-
mate change. And unlike future generations,
developing countries have a voice in con-
temporary climate negotiations. is may
open a window of opportunity in upcoming
negotiations to integrate such countries into
global mitigation schemes.
e UN climate summit (COP-15) in Co-
penhagen this December is going to be a
critical moment in developing such a plan.
ere, an agreement on the institutional de-
sign of a second commitment period to the
Kyoto Protocol shall be reached. With re-
spect to intergenerational justice, it will be
decisive to reach a binding agreement on
global emission reductions that sticks to a
maximum limited average temperature rise
of 2°C, and will be accepted by the highest
possible number of high-emission states.
To reach this goal however, the emerging
countries and some of the larger developing
countries must participate. e broadened
agenda of international climate governance,
with adaptation and technology transfer as
part of a climate strategy sensitive to inter-
national justice, can help to manage this
challenge. It raises the possibility of package
deals that compensate participating develop-
ing and emerging countries with technology
partnerships, fund adaptation and oﬀer
knowledge transfers, all of which together
could enable disadvantaged countries to de-
velop their economies in a sustainable man-
ner.
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The Baker’s Dozen: Key Nations Can and Should Act Together
to Prevent Further Dangerous Climate Change1
by Dr. Kirsten Oleson;2 Dr. Lauren Hartzell;3 Dr. Michael D. Mastrandrea4
bstract: Most international responses
to climate change assume we need a
‘global’ solution. Game theory and
political science both support limiting the ne-
gotiating parties to enable a more rapid and
aggressive response. Given that 90 percent of
emissions come from 12 percent of nations, we
argue if a ‘Baker’s Dozen’ of nations bands to-
gether, they can make great strides in combat-
ing climate change. With aggressive measures,
their action would be suﬃcient to greatly re-
duce the likelihood of additional dangerous cli-
mate change, deﬁned as widespread and
irreversible change. We give three reasons why
these nations should act: ability to act; respon-
sibility to act; self-interest in acting.
Introduction
e projected impact of severe climate
change, the urgency of cutting greenhouse
gas emissions, and the current political en-
vironment oﬀer a unique moment for re-
considering policy options for curbing
global climate change. Most international
responses to climate change assume we need
a ‘global’ solution, in which most if not all of
the world’s nations participate in an emis-
sion reduction agreement. But the majority
of the world’s emissions derive from a hand-
ful of nations, so we may be able to achieve
suﬃcient reductions by involving fewer na-
tions. Limiting the negotiating parties may
enable a more rapid and aggressive response.
is paper asks the question: can and should
a sub-group of nations act together to avoid
further dangerous climate change? We con-
clude yes on both counts. is approach is
not new – we base it on lessons from politi-
cal science and game theory. Our paper seeks
to establish that this approach also has scien-
tiﬁc and moral justiﬁcation. We ﬁrst argue
that if a sub-group of key nations bands to-
gether, they can make great strides in com-
bating climate change; with aggressive
measures, their action would be suﬃcient to
greatly reduce the likelihood of additional
dangerous climate change as we deﬁne it.
Our second major argument addresses why
these key nations should take immediate ac-
tion; we give three reasons. First, the sub-
group is able to signiﬁcantly decrease the
likelihood of dangerous climate changes and
the participation of certain nations is critical.
Second, all key nations bear responsibility
for acting because of their historical or pro-
jected future emissions. ird, it is in the in-
terest of these nations to act to mitigate
dangerous climate change.
Lessons from game theory and political
science
Insights from game theory and political sci-
ence make the case that a core group of na-
tions may be more eﬀective in reaching
quick and ambitious agreements than work-
ing to achieve a global consensus. e major
insight from these literatures is that any
agreement has to be in the best interest of
each of the parties. If a country feels like the
cost of accession to the agreement outweigh
the associated beneﬁts (or beneﬁts from de-
fection outweigh the costs), then the agree-
ment will not form or endure, because
countries will defect, cheat, or refuse to take
part. e following four overlapping lessons
derive from game theory and political sci-
ence literatures and can be used to analyse
international agreements.5
(1) Game theory shows that a large group
negotiation will lead to consensus matching
the aspiration of the least ambitious party.
is is supported by political science: as the
number of interests in a negotiation in-
crease, the harder it is to ﬁnd a combination
of measures that will make each nation bet-
ter oﬀ. If we need to meet ambitious targets,
we would do better to limit the number of
negotiating parties.
(2) When many parties are involved in an
agreement, there is little cost to defection and
little beneﬁt of accession for any individual
actor. is means all nations will have a
strong incentive to free ride, and their defec-
tion (or accession) will have little eﬀect on
other parties. Any agreement will therefore
never be in equilibrium, parties will defect,
and the environmental eﬀect will be minimal.
(3) A more likely long-term, self-enforcing,
and adaptable global solution will arise when
multiple, variable-sized coalitions each de-
termine their own appropriate aspirations
and national actions to meet the set goals.
e likelihood of accession and self-en-
forcement of national actions will be much
higher under this model.6 e more inﬂexible
the policy targets, the less likely a multi-
party solution will form or endure because
nations will not be able to implement na-
tional measures aligned with their interests
and, moreover, their national institutional
capacities.
(4) Some nations will need to pay other na-
tions to keep them as parties. Given the po-
litical debate of global climate change, no
agreement will include lesser-developed na-
tions unless more-developed nations (who,
not coincidentally, have higher historical
emissions) agree to pay them. Game theory,
too, establishes the importance of side pay-
ments from rich nations to keep poorer na-
tions as parties to agreements.7
ese extensive literatures provide one very
important lesson: a global agreement on cli-
mate change is very unlikely, and what will
result will be inadequate and unstable. We
are more likely to see coalitions and parallel
agreements where some countries do more
and all parties take a bottom-up approach
reﬂecting their national incentives and insti-
tutional capabilities.
Empirical evidence also speaks to the utility
of side agreements in international environ-
mental policy. e decade between the estab-
lishment of the climate change framework
convention and the ratiﬁcation of the im-
plementing protocol, and the US’s refusal to
ratify the protocol, are evidence of the diﬃ-
culty of coordinating diverse national inter-
ests.8 e Montreal Protocol, one of the
most successful international environmental
agreements,9 started with just 28 nations.
Recent policy discussions, for example at the
G20 or the L20, have focused on developing
an international climate change policy based
on initial agreements by a select group of na-
tions. However these discussions have oc-
curred under the shadow of on-going
international climate negotiations and there
A
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is signiﬁcant evidence that agreeing to side-
deals prior to wider negotiations could lead
to worse environmental outcomes when
these deals are not contingent on later action
by other negotiating parties.10 We cannot say
how these discussions would have ended had
there been no concurrent global negotiation
process.11
Urgency of and thresholds for required
action
Dangerous climate change is a normative
concept describing a situation where the im-
pacts of climate change have exceeded a level
society has deemed to be acceptable; it is a
value judgment informed by our scientiﬁc
understanding of projected climate change
impacts. No speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference’ was delineated
in the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, in part because
what constitutes ‘dangerous’ can diﬀer based
on diﬀering worldviews, values, geographic
location, or abilities to adapt. We assess what
is dangerous through the lens of human wel-
fare, which we consider to be normatively
valuable and worth protecting, now and into
the future. Since human welfare relies on
services provided by the earth, the loss of es-
sential services without the possibility of re-
placement, restoration, or substitution
constitutes a dangerous impact.
Given the goal of avoiding further danger-
ous climate change, scholars have worked
on deﬁning the interrelated physical metrics
of an acceptable temperature rise, deter-
mining what the associated atmospheric sta-
bilisation level would be, and then estimating
what annual emissions pathway or cumula-
tive emissions budget would enable us to
keep to that stabilisation target. ese studies
converge on some targets for allowable
temperature change, stabilisation concen-
tration, and emissions levels. We note that
these targets are still uncertain and fraught
with value judgments, especially with regard
to the embedded assumptions about accept-
able levels of risk. To produce a policy-rele-
vant cumulative emissions budget, we
specify (a) an acceptable temperature rise,
and (b) a long-term atmospheric carbon di-
oxide stabilisation level and the short-term
overshoot of the stabilisation target.
We set our target stabilisation temperature
at 1 degree Celsius above 2000 levels. Our
target translates to ~1.6 degrees above pre-
industrial temperatures, slightly below the
2-degree EU policy target and roughly
equivalent to the 1.5-degree limit proposed
by the Alliance of Small Island States.12 We
follow other studies drawing on the IPCC’s
“Reasons for Concern” as a way to deﬁne
what temperature change could be consid-
ered “dangerous” if sustained over the long-
term13 ey represent the developers’ best
approximation regarding the magnitude of
risk in each category we can expect at diﬀer-
ent temperature levels. For our purposes, we
consider running a “severe risk” within these
Reasons for Concern as an appropriate
threshold for dangerous because, as we will
show, this would trigger impacts that
threaten the irreversible loss of services im-
portant to many people’s welfare.
A recent update of the temperature change
that would induce severe risk in each Rea-
son for Concern gives a range of 1 – 2.5 de-
grees warming above 2000.14 Within that
range, where we should set the threshold de-
pends on value judgments about the relative
importance of each Reason for Concern.
Setting a threshold at 1 degree above 2000
would avoid running a severe risk for all.
Even at this level, we will face a litany of im-
pacts and a greater than 1-degree rise could
result in far worse consequences due to non-
linearities in the climate system and the sur-
prises they could bring.
With a 1-degree above 2000 rise in global
average temperature, we will likely experi-
ence signiﬁcant, widespread impacts and as-
sociated risks to unique and threatened
ecosystems, including more frequent and
extensive coral bleaching and increased vul-
nerability of Arctic and small island com-
munities. We will also experience increased
intensities in extreme weather events, such
as cyclones, heat waves, droughts, and
ﬂoods, which will in turn cause more deaths,
injuries, and damage to property. People
living in poor, low-lying, low-latitude areas
will run the highest risk, but people in rich
nations are not immune to vulnerabilities (as
evidenced, for example, by deaths from the
heat waves in Europe in 2003).
Perhaps most salient to our argument, with
a 1-degree rise, we will run a moderately
signiﬁcant risk of large-scale discontinuities
in the climate system, including such im-
pacts as partial or full deglaciation of the
Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets. If
this melting were to occur, sea levels could
rise many meters and life-sustaining ocean
currents could be disrupted.15 A large portion
of the earth’s freshwater has, for many, many
years been trapped in these ice sheets.16
ese reservoirs of ice serve multiple physi-
cal functions including the storage of water
and reﬂection of sunlight. A number of
large-scale impacts would result from the
loss of these ice sheets. eir complete melt-
ing could cause a sea level rise of up to 12
meters, while partial melting, predicted to
occur over centuries, could cause a sea level
rise of up to 6 meters. is rise would per-
manently ﬂood many coastal and low-lying
areas, including New Orleans, the Nether-
lands, Bangladesh, and most low-lying,
small island nations. is would aﬀect any
nation with a coast, which depends upon
coastal infrastructure (such as ports in near-
by nations or trading partners), or which
cannot adapt to rising sea levels. Secondly,
the inﬂux of freshwater could change global
ocean circulation. Climate change-induced
melting of ice will aﬀect ocean currents by
causing an inﬂux of less dense freshwater.
Similarly, stratiﬁcation of the ocean’s water
will be fortiﬁed by warming of surface water,
preventing mixing. e ocean is one of the
planet’s most important carbon sinks. Ocean
circulation regulates the contact of deep
ocean water with the atmosphere, governing
carbon uptake by the ocean. An alteration
of this carbon exchange will decrease the
amount of carbon dioxide taken out of the
atmosphere by the ocean. e third wide-
spread impact caused by the partial loss of
the ice sheets is loss of snow/ice cover. Loss
of snow/ice cover causes a positive feedback
by reducing the Earth’s reﬂectivity, therefore
causing more of the sun’s heat to be
absorbed. is feedback will accelerate cli-
mate change.
Distressingly, warming estimated as ‘in the
pipeline’ is already slightly over this 1-degree
target.17 In other words, this amount of
warming will likely occur even if we could
freeze atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide at today’s level of 385 ppm CO2 be-
cause of inertia in the climate system (com-
pare with pre-industrial levels of about 280
ppm). Based on Solomon et al, Meinshau-
sen el al. and Hansen et al., we set our long-
term stabilisation target at no more than
current concentrations.18
e immense inertias in both the climate
and social systems require us to exceed the
long-term target by a certain amount for a
certain amount of time while policy
measures take eﬀect and past emissions em-
bedded in the climate system run their
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course.19 e lower and shorter the over-
shoot, the smaller the probability of wide-
spread, irreversible change.20 In our scenario,
the overshoot peaks at ~427 ppm CO2 in
2050, and declines thereafter, achieving sta-
bilisation back at 385 ppm CO2 around
2150.21
Given the limits we have determined about
temperatures and the associated stabilisation
overshoot scenario, we are now prepared to
set an appropriate level of total global emis-
sions between the years 2000 – 2050; a value
we will refer to as cumulative emissions. Nu-
merous studies have estimated the cumula-
tive emissions we can generate over the
remainder of the ﬁrst half of this century. To
meet the stabilisation level we have chosen,
the cumulative global emissions budget for
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel
consumption over the period 2000 – 2050 is
around 290 gigatons carbon (GtC)22
Our proposal: A side agreement
Our proposal is for a sub-group of nations to
make a side agreement and thereby greatly
decrease the likelihood of further dangerous
climate change. is section makes the
scientiﬁc case for our approach. As relatively
few nations are responsible for the vast ma-
jority of global emissions, international
agreements to reduce those emissions sig-
niﬁcantly do not require the involvement of
all nations. As Figure 1 illustrates, we gain a
signiﬁcant amount of leverage from surpris-
ingly few nations, with 90 percent of emis-
sions coming from 12 percent of nations.23
e ﬁgure shows the cumulative emissions
of countries ranked by their national annual
emissions in 2004.
Figure 1: Cumulative global emissions by
number of nations counted. Vertical line
delineates the top thirteen global emitters, a
group we refer to as the ‘Baker’s Dozen’. Note
that the x-axis is presented on a log scale.
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Model
We have two criteria for an eventual side
agreement. First, it must be able to get glo-
bal emissions within limits to meet our cu-
mulative emissions budget. Second, the
called-for measures must be within reason-
able bounds of technical feasibility. For the
reasons explained above, we limit the num-
ber of actors in the agreement. For our
model, we selected the minimum number of
nations required by ranking countries by
their current annual emissions; we discuss
this a bit later.
A number of possible scenarios of national-
level action emerge to cut emissions of car-
bon dioxide from fossil fuel consumption.
e question is which option can keep us
below our deﬁned 290 GtC cap. We model
scenarios varying ﬁve parameters: (i) coun-
tries involved, (ii) required annual emissions
reductions, (iii) necessary annual sequestra-
tion, (iv) the year in which emissions peak,
and (v) the year in which sequestration be-
gins. We set a number of conditions: (a)
emissions reductions cannot exceed 5 per-
cent a year, (b) sequestration potential can-
not exceed n*5 percent of 2000 emissions
levels, where n is the number of years after
sequestration started (so the ﬁrst year, a na-
tion sequesters the equivalent of 5 percent
of its 2000 emissions, the second year 10
percent, the third year 15 percent, and so on
until 2050), and (c) wealthier nations have
to start reducing emissions and sequestering
earlier than developing nations. While the
bounds for emissions and sequestration are
aggressive, they fall within the range deemed
reasonable by climate scholars and industry
analysts.24
ese scenarios are
based on a simple mo-
del of national carbon
dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel consump-
tion, cement manu-
facturing, and gas
ﬂaring using data on
past emissions by
countries.25 We separat-
ed countries into two
development categories
where most developed
are countries consid-
ered high income per
the World Development Indicators, and
least developed are all others.26 We grouped
the 27 European Union countries and con-
sidered them as one entity; and we removed
Iran from the sub-group. We calculated the
emissions growth rate over the period 2002–
2004 to extrapolate emissions in 2005–
2009. Our model disaggregates required
emissions cuts by country, given a future
date after which emissions must decline (cal-
led the peak year) and a future date at which
sequestration must begin (called the seque-
stration year). Emissions decline at a con-
stant annual rate after the peak year until the
nation’s emissions reach zero. Every year
after the sequestration year, a nation’s seque-
stration ca- pacity increases a set percentage
of its year 2000 emissions. We assume emis-
sions from nations not within the Baker’s
Dozen would continue to grow at the glo-
bal average historical rate of over 3 percent a
year.27
With these assumptions, we ﬁnd a group of
only thirteen nations is necessary to stay
below the cap and keep reductions and se-
questration within reasonable bounds (re-
presented by the vertical line in Figure 1).
While these nations must abide by strictures,
emissions from the rest of the world can
continue growing at historical rates. is
group, which we refer to as the Baker’s
Dozen – the US, the EU-27, China, Japan,
Russia, India, Canada, South Korea, South
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Australia, and
Brazil – must agree to aggressive annual re-
ductions (5 percent) starting in 2012 for de-
veloped nations and 2015 for developing
nations. As shown in Table 1, to meet the
cumulative emissions cap of 290 GtC, these
reductions need to be coupled with aggres-
sive sequestration (5 percent of 2000 level
emissions, growing at an additional 5 per-
cent each year thereafter) starting in 2015
for developed nations and 2030 for develop-
ing nations. Reducing emissions could be
achieved by, for instance, improving energy
eﬃciency or switching to low-carbon fuel
sources. Carbon sequestration involves re-
moving carbon already emitted from the at-
mosphere in order to achieve a negative rate
of emission growth; examples include car-
bon capture and storage and reforestation.
In this scenario, the thirteen nations must se-
quester 132 Gt C by 2050; which seems to be
within the bounds of estimated global poten-
tial.28 By 2050, these nations would be seques-
tering 8 Gt C per year. Studies seem optimistic
that research and development will reduce
costs of carbon sequestration technologies and
these, combined with eﬃciency, better agri-
cultural and forestry practices, and fuel
switches, can bring us within the required
bounds,29 although others are more skeptical.30
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Why key nations should (and must) act to
prevent DCC
Having established that key nations can act
to make signiﬁcant gains in averting dange-
rous climate change, we identify three sepa-
rate reasons why they should act.
Preventing further dangerous climate change
requires the action of essential nations
e nations in the Baker’s Dozen have it in
their power to eﬀectively prevent further
dangerous changes. Signiﬁcant action has to
be taken now if we are to eﬀectively combat
dangerous climate change. Pumping ever
more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere
locks in further warming and all its associ-
ated impacts. e current growth in global
emissions is increasing the likelihood of ir-
reversible, dangerous changes and decreasing
the likelihood we will be able to adapt. We
believe the physical and moral necessity of
preventing the worst outcomes of dangerous
climate change is so urgent it should trump
other considerations normally embedded in
climate agreements, if (and only if ) those
considerations are stumbling blocks for im-
mediate action. Arguments from other areas
of policy making substantiate the justiﬁca-
tion for prioritising action when a crisis
threatens.31
e Baker’s Dozen are among the most able
to act to prevent dangerous climate change.
e rich, highest-emitting nations have
money to invest, e.g., in the research and de-
velopment of clean technologies, and they
have consumption habits that can be altered
to reduce per capita emissions, e.g., eating
less meat and instigating energy eﬃciency
standards; while the highest emitting devel-
oping nations have the most potential for
changing their development paths to less
carbon-intensive ones, e.g., by adopting car-
bon-free energy technologies developed in
the richer nations or adopting eﬃciency
codes for buildings.
Some nations within the Baker’s Dozen are
essential parties because without them, no
agreement will prevent dangerous climate
change. Because the currency we need to re-
duce is cumulative emissions from 2000-
2050, the most important actors are those
who are – or who will be – the largest emit-
ters over that period. By paring down the
subgroup to a minimal thirteen, our model
shows we cannot avoid further dangerous
climate change without signiﬁcant action by
all these players. If we expand the number
of nations slightly, however, for example ad-
ding in the next 7 top emitters (Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Ukraine, Taiwan, ailand, Turkey,
and Kazakhstan), the only nations with the
power to cause a failure if one were to defect
are China, the US, and the EU-27. China is
always an essential player; without action
from China, the rest of the world will have
a diﬃcult time staying under the cap even if
they enact signiﬁcant cuts and sequestration
eﬀorts.
e thirteen nations included in our model
are a rough approximation of what a sub-
group might look like. We ﬁnd thirteen par-
ties are minimally necessary to achieve the
cap and meet our conditions regarding emis-
sions cuts and sequestration. We are inter-
ested in establishing the minimal number of
parties because a smaller group has advan-
tages, as we have already discussed. e exact
membership of a sub-group is not prescribed
by our approach – we could come up with a
diﬀerent list and defend it both empirically
and normatively, for example by substituting
one country for one or more with similar
emissions. Nonetheless, we believe the Bak-
er’s Dozen is a sub-group with bite: with just
thirteen nations, we capture 83 percent of
global emissions; to get just 9 percent more
would require doubling the number of ne-
gotiating parties. Further, these nations are
particularly able to act and, as we discuss
next, bear disproportionate responsibility.
Responsibility supports necessity of action by key
nations
We believe responsibility for preventing the
crossing of the dangerous threshold lies with
those most responsible for contributing to
the problem and those who will contribute
to the problem if they do not signiﬁcantly
rein in their emissions. e wealthier nations
bear the greatest historical responsibility for
increasing the atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases, which is why mitigating
dangerous climate change is such a pressing
issue in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, their
greater wealth is due in large part to these
emissions. ey therefore have more
responsibility for taking action. e less de-
veloped nations in the Baker’s Dozen accrue
responsibility to act as well because of their
projected future emissions. ey are project-
ed to have signiﬁcant emissions growth if
they develop on a business-as-usual, carbon-
intensive pathway. As a result of their
economic development, these nations’ emis-
sions are growing at rates far higher than de-
veloped nations. Indeed, in 2008, China
surpassed the US in terms of absolute emis-
sions (though per capita is still far lower).
Concerns about equity go hand-in-hand
with historical responsibility. Negotiations
are often bogged down by concerns that de-
veloping nations will be condemned to
lower levels of economic development if
they are required to curb their emissions.
Equity and fairness considerations, it seems,
suggest less developed nations should have
the same rights and abilities to develop that
wealthier countries had, especially since their
emissions have to be reduced because of the
emissions (and associated development) of
richer nations. We have shown, however, if
key developing nations continue on emis-
sions-intensive development paths, danger-
ous climate change will ensue; their
involvement in an agreement is crucial.
e seeming contradiction between moral
and pragmatic arguments regarding develop-
ing nations’ emissions pathways can at least
in part be reconciled by an agreement
among the Baker’s Dozen with diﬀerential
responsibilities for less and more developed
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Table 1: Cumulative global emissions by 2050 with thirteen minimal nations in agreement.
Values in white fall below the cumulative emissions cap of 290 Gt C required to avoid further
dangerous climate change. e grey box indicates sequestration and emission reductions within
reasonable bounds of technical feasibility.
Given the nature and magnitude of the
challenge, national action alone is insufficient.
No nation can address this challenge on
its own. No region can insulate itself from
these climate changes. That is why we need
to confront climate change within a global
framework.
/ Ban-Ki Moon /
parties. Our proposal includes diﬀerential
responsibilities for action based on a nation’s
level of development and corresponding
contributions to climate change. For exam-
ple, our approach allows developing nations
to have more time to begin cuts; developed
nations will make side-payments to less de-
veloped nations to keep them as parties to
the agreement; and the parties involved can
negotiate future reevaluations to assess if de-
veloping countries, despite legitimate eﬀorts
to cut emissions, are falling behind eco-
nomically, in which case developed nations
should have to cut more.
It is in the self-interest of key nations to act
To protect their national interests, the na-
tions in the Baker’s Dozen should act to pre-
vent dangerous climate change. As we have
presented above, dangerous climate change
will cause widespread negative impacts
around the world. e nations in the Baker’s
Dozen will only bear a fraction of the global
damages from climate change, but as in-
creasing evidence suggests the costs could be
enormous and, if severe climate change oc-
curs, it could be socially destabilising on a
global scale.32 While the key nations will
likely not suﬀer the worst impacts of danger-
ous climate change relative to all nations
when measured as percentage of GDP, per-
centage of population aﬀected, or severity of
impacts, they will nonetheless experience
signiﬁcant negative impacts. Dangerous cli-
mate change is a global threat and the extent
of the national-level projected impacts can
be interpreted as threats to national security.
As such it is in every nation’s self-interest to
act to prevent it. e self-interest argument
is also one about moral duties. ese coun-
tries have a duty to protect their own citi-
zens.
It may seem unfair to focus on just a few na-
tions – whether the Baker’s Dozen or an-
other sub-group – when all nations arguably
have a duty to act to prevent further dange-
rous climate change. We believe that the
duty to act also involves entering into the
most promising negotiations with other
countries seeking to fulﬁll their duties. is
implies that nations may be morally obligat-
ed to enter into side agreements if these are
the most promising way to advance serious
climate change solutions. Further, the nature
of the problem we are facing – its severity
and its urgency – means that we have little
time to worry about only ‘doing our fair
share’. Some nations are going to have to do
more than others in order to prevent further
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dangerous climate change. In part, the duty
of those who act is reinforced by the fact that
other nations are not acting – the fact that
some nations are not taking action makes
the problem all the more urgent and dire,
and reinforces the moral obligation of those
nations that can and will act.
Moreover, if we focus on just the nations in
the Baker’s Dozen, it is apparent that ignor-
ing the rest of the world raises less of a con-
cern than it might seem to. It is unclear
exactly what fairness dictates in mitigating
climate change (decades of climate debate
speak to this), but the rest of the world’s his-
torical and current emissions are so small
compared to the Baker’s Dozen that leaving
them out is not all that far from ‘fair’. Of
course, over time, the countries included in
the sub-group would have to be adapted as
new large emitters emerge, but nothing with-
in our approach prohibits this and we see
room for multiple coalitions forming à la the
Baker’s Dozen.
Conclusion
While a side agreement would require sig-
niﬁcant and urgent reductions in emissions
from its signers, we conclude that it is pos-
sible to avoid further dangerous climate
change if a sub-group of thirteen nations –
minimally the US, EU-27, Japan, China,
India, Russia, Canada, South Korea, South
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Australia, and
Brazil – take immediate action. is action
would involve deep and rapid cuts in emis-
sions in the short-term and large-scale car-
bon sequestration in the medium-term. A
side deal circumvents the collective action
problem plaguing global climate negotia-
tions and, as both game theory and political
science teach us, may enable more rapid and
aggressive agreements.
e normative case for the approach is built
on the principle that every nation has a duty
to act, but we are in such a dire situation
that pursuing second-best solutions is ap-
propriate. Key moral concerns that have
dominated climate discussions should come
secondary to achieving action; but we show
that some can be integrated with an even-
tual side deal policy and can remain the aim
of long-term climate change policy. Moral
concerns, and particularly concerns about
justice, can “muddy the picture and threat-
en to interfere with eﬀorts to negotiate an
eﬀective climate change regime in the fu-
ture,”33 but they need not conﬂict with prag-
matic approaches. We believe that ﬁnding
ways in which pragmatic concerns and
moral considerations align can strengthen
the case for eﬀective climate policies.
We urge the current global climate change
negotiating forum – culminating in Copen-
hagen in December 2009 – to be a venue
which facilitates side deals. We fear a sole
focus of achieving a global consensus on
binding targets will not achieve the level and
speed of reductions needed, nor result in
long-term buy-in by key nations. While im-
perfect, we believe our approach could be a
way to break out of the collective action stale-
mate and prevent widespread, irreversible
impacts.
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that it requires strong, concerted,
consistent and enduring action by
governments.
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limate change has witnessed a
rapid rise in public awareness with-
in the last years and months. e
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in
2007 marked a breakthrough in this devel-
opment as the true magnitude and the pos-
sibly devastating consequences of climate
change were scientiﬁcally underlined in pub-
lic. is led to a short-lived ﬂurry of activ-
ities and declarations to mitigate global
climate change by politicians around the
globe. Most of the promises and declarations
made were soon curbed or forgotten in the
face of the emerging global ﬁnancial and
economic crisis. One of the few lasting po-
sitives regarding the upcoming negotiations
for a post-Kyoto agreement in Copenhagen
are the change of the US climate policy after
the election of President Obama and ﬁrst sig-
nals hinting at Chinas willingness to talk
about a deﬁnite date for a peak of their emis-
sions. If the Copenhagen meeting does not
render decisive results, future generations
will most likely pay the price for this lack of
action, making climate change a key issue of
intergenerational justice.
Fortunately for future generations it seems
that the science sector is living up to its role
of broaching relevant issues without follow-
ing public attention cycles, and has not
abandoned the topic. Nevertheless, the
rising number of publications makes it in-
creasingly diﬃcult to decide which publica-
tions are relevant and path breaking for the
debate.
e anthology Political eory and Global
Climate Change, edited by Steve Vanderhei-
den of the University of Colorado at Boul-
der, is one of those publications potentially
oﬀering useful insights by approaching the
topic from a new angle. It does so by apply-
ing green political theory to global climate
change.
Composed of eight English articles, the an-
thology aims to oﬀer interdisciplinary and
innovative approaches to the normative
questions arising when dealing with global
climate change and its consequences. e
philosophy behind the book is that, in order
to comprehend the nature of global climate
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change, we should not only approach it
from a natural science perspective, but also
from a political angle. is includes ques-
tioning our social and political concepts,
norms and ideals that are part of the prob-
lem and rethinking them as a part of the
solution.
e anthology is divided into two parts. Part
I on Justice, Ethics and Global Climate
Change deals with distributive justice con-
cerns, while Part II on Climate Change, Na-
ture, and Society highlights the realities of
particular concerns stemming from global
climate change.
e ﬁrst part emphasizes the highly relevant
questions of justice in the reduction of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that will
be necessary to mitigate the worst conse-
quences of global climate change. Argu-
ments by the US and other Western
governments demanding a “fair share” of the
burdens by major developing countries meet
claims by India and China. ese countries
claim that, due to the fact that the developed
countries were able to fuel their growth with-
out considerations of GHG emissions in the
past decades, any strict caps would hamper
their economic growth. Focusing on this
central question of international justice, the
ﬁrst part of the book is the more consistent
one. It is also the part with the most rele-
vance in the scope of intergenerational jus-
tice since most articles address the need for
a just solution between the generations in
order to come to an overall just solution of
burden sharing between generations, nations
and individuals.
e ﬁrst article by Leigh Raymond (Purdue
University) assesses different approaches for
a morally and politically fair allocation of
the earth’s atmospheric capacities. He states
that a treaty on the reduction of GHG emis-
sions will only be successful if it is perceived
as fair by the signatories. He introduces the
principles of equal burdens, equal eﬃciency,
equal rights and equal subsistence rights as
potential concepts for a treaty. e equal
burdens approach is based on the right of
nations to their current level of emission
shares based on Humean (possession) and
Lockean (prior use) views. As a consequence
reductions from the current output are treat-
ed equally without considering historical
outputs or the current share of the global
output. e equal eﬃciency notion states
that there should be a benchmark for accept-
able emission rates per unit of economic
production. e equal rights and equal sub-
sistence rights approaches put forward that
each person has a right for a certain per
capita emission, possibly taking into account
historic emissions. is solution would en-
tail the most radical cuts for the developed
nations. Equal subsistence rights reﬁne this
argument by distinguishing between luxury
and subsistence emission, the latter being
necessary for maintaining a basic standard
of living. By assessing past agreements on
the common use of the open sea, the Ant-
arctic and outer space, Raymond shows that
ideas of possession have been dominant in
the past. Nevertheless, he detects a tendency
to accept ideas of common human heritage
and arguments of economic need and eﬃ-
ciency which could lead the way towards
new solutions to the allocation dilemma of
climate change mitigation.
Raymond puts the current allocation prob-
lems into perspective and allows for a better
evaluation of the current discussion by
analysing past approaches to the allocation
of global commons. e article contrasts
current theoretical models with past prac-
tices and is a good example of how a well-
balanced mixture of political theory and
practical analysis can lead to valuable results.
Stephen Gardiner’s (University of Washing-
ton) article uses the concept of the perfect
storm to explain problems we encounter
when trying to ﬁnd just approaches to cli-
mate change mitigation. e storms Gardi-
ner analyses are the global storm, meaning
the global dispersion of causes and eﬀects of
climate change, the intergenerational storm,
meaning that climate change is a lagged
phenomenon unfolding its full conse-
quences on future generations, and the theo-
retical storm, meaning that there is no
adequate theory to grasp the whole dimen-
sion of climate change. e theoretical
storm results form the inability to deal with
long-term problems like intergenerational
equity, contingent persons and scientiﬁc un-
certainty. ese storms overlap and hamper
mankind’s ability to cope with the problem
of global climate change, forming thus the
perfect moral storm. Gardiner then includes
the problem of moral corruption to explain
how doubts, distractions, complacency and
hypocrisy in the political debate add to the
global moral storm and obstruct problem-
solving.
Even though Gardiner’s model of a perfect
moral storm helps to understand the diﬃ-
culties we are having in searching for a way
to cope with climate change, the model ap-
pears somewhat fabricated. is is due to the
fact that the global and intergenerational
storms are convincing models, but the theo-
retical storm is oﬀ point with its close link to
the problems of moral corruption prevent-
ing us from getting a clear picture of the
overall situation. Furthermore the ‘missing
theory’ / ‘moral corruption’ problem has to
be seen as a cause and a result of the global
and intergenerational storms which leads to
a lack in precision of the theoretical frame-
work.
e third contribution, written by editor
Steve Vanderheiden (University of Colorado
at Boulder), analyses the possibilities of an
eﬀective solution to the allocation problem
that also meets our ideas of fairness. He
recurs to the equal subsistence rights pers-
pective in search for such a solution. Accord-
ing to Vanderheiden, the right to develop,
the right to stable climate, the right to a
share of atmospheric capacities, and the
right to survival emissions are environmental
rights that should be implemented in inter-
national public law. He deducts the right to
development of disadvantaged societies,
which might be contested due to its exten-
sive range, convincingly from notions of jus-
tice, stating that the “natural lottery of birth”
(p. 62) should not continue to dictate the
life prospects of people.
A fair approach to climate change mitigation
should respect these rights, and can become
eﬀective through radical cuts of luxury emis-
sions in industrialised nations which are
based on weaker rights. Vanderheiden does
not comment on the (probably low) feasibil-
ity of his ideas in the scope of the current in-
ternational power balance. is does not
weigh too heavy though, since the author
delivers a concept that envisions solutions
beyond the restrictions of today that are
direly needed in order to cope with an un-
precedented challenge. Considering the shift-
ing power balance in favour of developing
nations in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis and
the new US climate policy, developments are
playing out in favour of Vanderheiden’s con-
cept.
Martin Adamian’s (California State Univer-
sity) article provides a comprehensive over-
view on the way international environmental
law is being formed, and addresses the prob-
lems of international power balance missing
in Chapter 3. He describes the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as ﬂedg-
lings of a new system of environmental law.
At the same time, he depicts the limitations
of contemporary international law to deal
with the problems of climate change. One
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of his key objections is that fair solutions can
only be reached if the process of reaching the
rules is fair in matters of equal contributions
of the persons concerned. Since interna-
tional law is made by states in an interna-
tional power balance, this is not ensured.
Even worse is that the interests of individuals
and sub-national groups are thereby ignor-
ed. e fact that international law needs to
be implemented by states and cannot be en-
forced adds up to the problem and leads Ada-
mian to the conclusion that a global people’s
sovereignty is needed in international law to
cope fairly and eﬀectively with the problem.
Adamian delivers a concise analysis of the
problems of contemporary international law.
Nevertheless, it could have gone further by
including a discussion of possible develop-
ments of international law. is could have
included a discussion on the possibilities to
ensure global participation by the world’s
people through NGOs, or an assessment of
the possibility of granting the people a sec-
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ond mandate, in addition to their mandate
for national governments, to a body on a
global level.
e second part of the book leaves the
mainly philosophical area of political theory
in order to bring the theory into the reality
of the situation. is case- and topic-oriented
approach makes the second part of the book
less salient, leading to a higher ﬂuctuation
of the quality of the included articles. Nev-
ertheless, this section oﬀers innovative in-
sights into tangible climate change issues
and proves that political theorising can go
beyond the ﬁgurative ivory tower. Unfortu-
nately, some articles fail to deliver a convinc-
ing composition of theoretical elements and
the realities of climate change. In these cases
the added value of applying a theory to cer-
tain problems remains vague and the ap-
proach appears to be laboured.
e ﬁfth article by Amy Lauren Lovecraft
(University of Alaska Fairbanks) uses the
concept of social-ecological systems (SESs)
to point out that human societies are closely
interlinked with their environment. She
then provides a case study on the wildﬁre
disturbance regime of the boreal forests and
the vanishing of seasonal ice in the arctic
region based on the SES concept.
e robustness of these SESs is decisive for
the future of mankind in a particular envi-
ronment. Damages to the environmental sys-
tem have repercussions on the society, and
whether it can recover from the damages
sustained, despite parts of the environmen-
tal system collapsing forever, depends on the
robustness of the combined SES. e way
people deﬁne their relation to the environ-
ment in these SES, under the inﬂuence of
political struggles and environmental gov-
ernance, is deﬁned as environmentality.
e subsequent case studies on the wildﬁre
regime of the boreal forests in Alaska and the
reaction to diminishing coastal sea ice illus-
trate how SESs, in their attempt to reach a
robust equilibrium, struggle for a balance
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between society and environment. is
struggle is a constant trade-oﬀ between the
interests of a society, potentially damaging
the environment, and environmental pro-
tection, potentially constraining a society.
e results of these trade-oﬀs remain uncer-
tain and it is key to develop institutions that
have the capacity to cope with these uncer-
tainties in order to ensure the wellbeing of
mankind.
e article delivers a comprehensive assess-
ment of the problems human societies are
facing when deﬁning their relation to an en-
vironment under stress from global climate
change. Its main accomplishment is uncov-
ering the close links our society still has to
local environments. We tend to forget how
much we depend on the particular environ-
ment we are living in. Lovecraft highlights
that we are the ones who are deﬁning our re-
lation to our environment and that we
should be more aware of the trade-oﬀs we
are committing ourselves to in environmen-
tal politics. Sadly, this core message is blur-
red by an overtly complicated theoretical
part that could have been written much
more concisely without losing depth.
Timothy Luke (Virginia State University)
points out in his article that global warming,
global dimming (the decrease of solar radia-
tion reaching earth) and global cooling are
socially constructed. ey are by-products
of an unsustainable economy that alters the
environment to a degree that Luke deﬁnes
it as “urbanatura”, a second creation shaped
by humans. is urbanatura is a construct-
ed world ecology/economy that is disor-
ganised and uncontrolled and thus growing
at an unsustainable pace, producing dama-
ging by-eﬀects that are excluded in capitalist
logic and keep causing a potentially des-
tructive change in global climate. Due to
this disorganisation the eﬀects of anthropo-
genic climate change cannot be addressed ef-
fectively. Social critique on a global level
does not go far enough to counteract this
disorganisation. Luke goes as far in his ana-
lysis as to ask whether the International Panel
on Climate Change is only masking the nega-
tive outcomes of urbanatura by maintaining
some environmental viability (pp. 141-143).
is dilemma calls, according to Luke, for a
renegotiation of all social relations to cope
with the changes caused by urbanatura.
Timothy Luke’s contribution describes strik-
ingly how anthropogenic climate change is
socially generated through an unsustainable
social concept created by mankind, with its
very logic denying us the possibility to cope
with the consequences of our doing. It is a
theoretically based description of the di-
lemma which mankind currently faces in
dealing with anthropogenic climate change,
nothing more and nothing less. As such the
article remains somewhat vague amongst the
other articles in part II which directly target
speciﬁc realities of climate change.
George Gonzales’ (University of Miami)
article on urban sprawl in the US is one of
the strongest of this anthology. e author
uses Marx’s conception that natural resources
have no intrinsic value to explain how urban
sprawl in the US was encouraged politically
in order to lead the US economy out of the
Great Depression in the 30s. According to
Marx, value is only created through social
labour. Money is only made with the con-
trol over raw materials, not with the resour-
ces themselves. Since resources like oil and
timber have no intrinsic value they could be
spent in great amounts in order to encourage
urban sprawl in the US and thereby spark
the demand on the US market. Consumers
were encouraged to build their own houses
in the suburbs through low oil and timber
prices, an easy credit policy and the promo-
tion of settlements the periphery of the cities
in US development plans. Since major US
cities have become increasingly sprawled, the
demand for cars has soared, creating a de-
pendence on the automobile. is process
was accompanied by a huge upsurge in the
demand for consumer durables. Gonzales
shows how this process was actively further-
ed by politicians and economic elites, who
were pursuing supply side politics on the oil
market. He also shows that government in-
duced urban sprawl in the US is one of the
main reasons for the over-proportional in-
crease in oil consumption of the US and
thus one of the causes for global climate
change.
In the context of today’s ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic crisis Gonzales article reveals a dis-
turbing timeliness. e logic behind
supporting ecologically and economically
unsustainable developments to stimulate
short-term economic growth is now back-
ﬁring on us twofold. One can read Gonzales’
article as a description of how the way to an-
thropogenic climate change and the US real
estate crisis was paved in the 30s. is raises
the uncomfortable question of for how long
we have been building our social founda-
tions on sand.
e last article by Peter Cannavò (Hamilton
College) analyses the dilemma that arises
when we have to decide whether to abandon
our homes that have become unsustainable
due to global climate change. Using the
example of hurricane-struck New Orleans
he describes a problem that many regions in
the world will soon face due to rising sea
levels and extreme weather conditions: can
we save our homes in potentially unsustain-
able regions in the face of climate change
eﬀects? Cannavò disagrees with the econom-
ists arguing that it would be cheaper to just
move away from unsustainable places in-
stead of investing in ﬂood control or the
stop of sea level rise. e author counters
this argument by saying that the idea of
home cannot be treated as a commodity be-
cause it has a high importance for our daily
routines and our social and individual deve-
lopment. He proves his point convincingly
with the example of New Orleans that was
hit by the hurricane Katrina in 2005. New
Orleans is both a culturally unique city due
to its rich cultural heritage as well as a highly
unsustainable city. New Orleans was built in
the wetlands of the mouth of the Mississippi
and is both under sea level as well as under
the level of the Mississippi. Many scientists
doubt that the whole city can be saved in the
long run from hurricanes and the rising sea
level. At the same time the plans for a de-
construction of the largely “black”
neighbourhoods in the low altitudes of the
city threaten the character of New Orleans.
Cannavò shows how the mainly African
American inhabitants of these neighbour-
hoods have been struck exceptionally hard
by hurricane Katrina. As a result the inhabi-
tants of entire neighbourhoods are spread
throughout the US after they lost their
homes. He also describes the psychological
damages the inhabitants suﬀered from the
destructions the storm caused and the
desperation of the inhabitants returning to
destroyed neighbourhoods with an unclear
future.
Describing the tragic fate of New Orleans
and its inhabitants, Cannavò convincingly
argues that we cannot limit ourselves to
adaption to climate change by leaving unsus-
tainable homes behind because the social
costs are just too high. He proposes a mix-
ture of adaptation and stronger eﬀorts in cli-
mate change mitigation in order to
minimise the dilemma of home vs. sustain-
ability. Due to the lagged eﬀects of anthro-
pogenic climate change the chances of
avoiding these dilemmas are relatively slim
and we unfortunately have to prepare our-
selves to discuss the dilemma presented by
the author on a more regular basis in the fu-
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ture. In this context his approach of calculat-
ing the social worth of home will prove im-
portant in reaching the right decisions.
All things considered, the anthology Political
eory and Global Climate Change does live
up to its aim to deliver new insights into the
problems stemming from global climate
change. A negative aspect is that it cannot
always fully bridge the gap between politi-
cal theory and the realities on the ground.
Nevertheless, it does broach some of the
most relevant problems mankind will face
when trying to mitigate global climate
change and its consequences. e issues ad-
dressed are not always new, but the antho-
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logy’s approach of green political theory usu-
ally oﬀers new perspectives in dealing with
known issues. Some articles like Luke’s con-
tribution on urbanatura and Gonzalez’ ana-
lysis of urban sprawl challenge our
traditional perspectives of social realities by
unmasking the self-destructive side eﬀects of
our way of life that we still tend to block out
in fear of too much change and that some-
times blinds us by its short-term beneﬁts.
Considering the ambitious aims of the an-
thology, namely to oﬀer new insights into
problems of climate change through an
interdisciplinary approach while marrying
theoretical thinking with considerations of
on the ground problems, the articles are a
respectable ﬁrst step and oﬀer a multitude
of starting points for further research. us
the anthology is, despite its negligible weak-
nesses, deﬁnitely an inspiring lecture in the
truest sense of the word.
Steve Vanderheiden (ed.): Political eory
and Global Climate change. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 280 pages. ISBN:
0262720523. Price: £15.15.
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n his postdoctoral lecture Climate
Change and Justice. Sustainability Ethics
from a Christian Perspective (only
available in German), the theologian and
specialist in Christian social ethics Andreas
Lienkamp tackles a crucial topic of our time.
e already abundant catalogue of econom-
ic and political literature on climate change
is hereby complemented by an important eth-
ical work. Lienkamp’s approach allows for
religious positions to be at times interpreted
in such an undogmatic way that the book
can even be read by philosophers critical of
theology to their real beneﬁt.
Lienkamp identiﬁes the handling of climate
change consequences as the key question
from an ethical point of view. Justice plays a
prominent role both in the search for cli-
mate change mitigation possibilities as well
as in negotiations on intergenerational and
international burden-sharing in adaptation.
Lienkamp uses the term ‘Ethik der Nach-
haltigkeit’ (sustainability ethics) to discuss
these questions from a Christian perspective.
On the one hand, the term is well chosen
since it is wide enough to include all aspects
of climate change and its consequences. On
the other hand, the deﬁnitions surrounding
the concept of sutainability are notoriously
blurred – a problem that Lienkamp prefers
to circumnavigate rather than to solve.
Lienkamp looks at the ethics of sustainability
from a Christian perspective but fortunately
refrains from conceptionalizing ethics of sus-
tainability as a purely Christian concept.
Solutions to climate change problems can-
not be found from a solely Christian point
of view since other religions and cultures
have to be won over for a truly global solu-
tion. Lienkamp’s deﬁnition of sustainable
ethics from a Christian perspective could be
interpreted as an invitation for dialogue and
could even initiate an intercultural debate
without appropriating the topic. In the same
context of dialogue Lienkamp stands up for
deeper cooperation of the scientiﬁc discipli-
nes on climate change. He explicitly deﬁnes
his approach as interdisciplinary and discur-
sive while still claiming the right to question
results of other disciplines from an ethical
point of view.
Lienkamp’s genuinely Christian perspective
draws mainly from the theology of creation
which the Christian religion also shares with
Judaism and Islam. Lienkamp underlines
that human beings are part of the creation
according to the theology of creation, and
thus have a responsibility towards it (p. 25).
e fact that mankind increasingly deﬁnes
itself as ruler of creation, instead of as a part
of it, is a main reason for the low popularity
of the concept of ethics.
Lienkamp’s analysis is based on the papal en-
cyclical Pacem in Terris of John XXIII and
the book Laymen in the Apostolate by the
Belgian bishop, cardinal and founder of the
International Young Christian Workers, Jo-
seph Cardijn. In his encyclical, John XXIII
emphasised the importance of the ‘signs of
the times’ for gaining insight in theology. He
deﬁned the signs of the times as harbinger
of great challenges or positive historical
developments which the church and believ-
ers should detect in order to act accordingly.
Lienkamp interprets climate change as such
a sign of the times and consults the method-
ology in three steps ‘Seeing – Judging – Act-
ing’ developed by Joseph Cardijn for an
analysis of climate change. He structures the
rest of his book according to these three
steps: chapter 2 analyses the causes, the con-
Andreas Lienkamp: Klimawandel und Gerechtigkeit.
Eine Ethik der Nachhaltigkeit in christlicher Perspektive
Reviewed by Jörg Tremmel and Patrick Wegner
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sequences and the status quo of climate
change (to see); chapter 3 describes the nor-
mative construction that Lienkamp consults
in his judgement (to judge) and chapter 4
delivers advice on eﬀective measures of
mitigation and adaptation inspired by ethics
of sustainability from a Christian perspec-
tive (to act).
e author has to be credited for his ability
to introduce all relevant scientiﬁc facts in a
short and concise way, through docu-
menting the most applicable statistics and
ﬁgures. As a theologian he manages to
describe the most relevant factors of climate
change and their interdependence in a more
accessible way than many climate scientists.
Considering the consequences of climate
change (like rising temperatures and sea
levels) he endorses the ﬁndings of the reports
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), which are seen as conserva-
tive estimations by some (p. 50). He justi-
ﬁes this with the remark that even conservative
estimations are suﬃcient to document the
need to act according to ethical considerati-
ons. In a similarly unagitated way Lienkamp
also solves the problem of the public dispute
be-tween sceptics and supporters of the the-
sis of anthropogenic climate change. With a
hint towards the scientiﬁc weight of the
IPCC calculation, resulting in a 95-100 per-
cent probability of climate change being an-
thropogenic as opposed to natural (p. 81),
Lienkamp clariﬁes the real weight of the
sceptic arguments without immerging into
the polemic debate with climate change
sceptics.
In accordance to the scientiﬁc literature,
Lienkamp names three man-made phenom-
ena as the main causes for on-going climate
change: the ever growing output of green-
house gases, the advancing deforestation de-
stroying one of the most important natural
CO2 reservoirs, as well as the rising popula-
tion ﬁgures and the need for food, energy
and resources that grows with them. He lists
heat, extreme weather phenomena, a loss of
biodiversity, malnutrition, water shortage as
well as conﬂicts resulting from this shortage
as consequences of climate change. e so-
called ‘tipping-elements’ in the climate sys-
tem are of special relevance for the potential
consequences of climate change, and Lien-
kamp mentions them at the end of the
second chapter (p. 153). e deglaciation of
frozen land masses or certain changes in the
Asian monsoon system can reach a point at
which they ‚tip over’. is means that these
developments can further accelerate climate
change or lead to catastrophic and irreversi-
ble consequences for mankind. In the
media, the potential ebbing of the Gulf
Stream due to the inﬂow of sweet water
from melting glaciers around the North Pole
is often cited as a potential tipping element
that could lead to a new ice age in Europe.
Lienkamp is using the irreversible character
of the tipping element phenomena as an
appeal for a principle of precaution in cli-
mate change matters (p. 135; 330-337).
In the third chapter Lienkamp derives the
responsibility of mankind for God’s creation
as a whole from the bible and genesis. He ar-
gues for a modern interpretation of the bible
according to the ‘relecture’ stipulated by
Pope John Paul II in this context. His core
arguments are that man has a responsibility
for creation as an image and deputy of God
on earth which results in his task to further
the immanent the ‘good’ of creation (p.
216). Lienkamp states in this context that
all humans, including future individuals
have to be seen as equal in this eﬀort. Lien-
kamp opposes the old interpretation of the
bible, which was supported by the church
for centuries that God told men to conquer
earth and multiply by quoting several other
passages of the bible. He reasons that the
reign of men on earth is connected with a
God-given responsibility and the mission to
populate the planet can only be interpreted
in the scope of an ecologically sustainable
growth. Interestingly, Lienkamp interprets
the Sabbath as a rest period which mankind
should respect in regular intervals in order
to facilitate the regeneration of natural re-
sources and a readjustment of the economic
system. Against the background of the cur-
rent ﬁnancial and economic crisis this seems
to be a very topical and thought-provoking
impulse!
One result of the ‘relecture’ of the bible is
the perspective that man is not creation’s
crowning glory but a part of it. From this
thought Lienkamp derives the rights of the
nature. He proves the increasing acceptance
of these rights with references to the Ger-
man constitution (Art 20a) and the Lisbon-
Treaty of the EU (Art 13).
To sum it up, Lienkamp denies an anthro-
pocentric point of view in favour of a holis-
tic, anthroporelational argument (p. 227).
Herein he refers to the grace of charity,
which he interprets as encompassing nature
in the sense of a ‘reverence for life’, a term
coined by Albert Schweitzer (p. 248). He
also refers to the virtue of justice, which
urges us to a responsible handling of the
Intergenerational Justice Review
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People that are religiously ‘nonmusical’, as
Lienkamp calls them following Habermas,
will perhaps have problems to accept the
core interpretation of Lienkamp’s book since
it relies strongly on the bible and thus on
God’s will and mandate. e Christian pers-
pective of the book probably appeals to
Muslims and Jews as well as it comes close to
a monotheistic approach. But it might be
less accessible to atheists or agnostics.
According to Lienkamp, there can be many
justiﬁcations (religious, ethical, economic)
for mankind’s obligation to save the climate.
While the lines of reasoning may vary, the
results of these deliberations converge and
press us to start acting. But this is doubtful
as the conservation of nature as the econom-
ic basis for mankind would not encompass
all species. e consequences of the intrinsic
and the instrumental approach to nature
protection are not identical.
In the fourth chapter (acting) Lienkamp de-
livers a complete and well-arranged overview
of measures that are discussed with regard to
climate change. True to his moral argument
he stresses the primacy of measures for miti-
gation. From energy transition to reforesta-
tion, ﬁnancial incentives and CO2-certiﬁcate
trading systems he explains a lot of widely-
discussed measures. But beyond that he also
mentions far-reaching measures that are dis-
cussed much too rarely or too shallowly in
politics, like ensuring an adequate ecologi-
cal education starting at school age. Among
these measures Lienkamp’s preoccupation
with a potential ‘third parliamentary cham-
ber’ in the political system sticks out. is
chamber is meant to represent the interests
of the future generations during the legisla-
tive procedure in trust as some sort of Fu-
ture Council. e introduction of such a
chamber with real veto-powers against laws
endangering the rights of future generations
would be an important instrument to com-
bat the short-sightedness of democratic sys-
tems that concentrate too much on the cycle
of election periods.
All in all, this is a well-researched and accu-
rately written book. One point of criticism
is that Lienkamp was not able to deliver on
his promise to consistently treat the issue
from an interdisciplinary point of view. Even
though chapters 3 and 4 regularly mention
legal sources and arguments one notices the
lack of inspiration from political or social
sciences. is is especially true for chapter 4,
in which political science theories could
have contributed signiﬁcantly in judging the
feasibility of these measures.
e book ends with a general call to take ac-
tion. Here, Lienkamp resorts to the anec-
dote, used in science and media so widely
that it has already become clichéd, that the
Chinese word for ‘crisis’ is composed of the
words ‘opportunity’ and ‘danger’. is is
meant to serve as a reminder to decision ma-
kers that bold measures are to be taken in
the face of great problems.
As a conclusion one can say that the book
delivers a well formulated and justiﬁed ac-
count of the ethics of sustainability which
could rise to the challenges of climate
change. e Christian perspective of the
book is always there, but never so intrusive
as to block an ethical approach to the topic.
e modern reinterpretations of biblical pas-
sages are also conclusive for non-religious
persons and oﬀers highly interesting per-
spectives and approaches. Almost in passing
Lienkamp also delivers a remarkably com-
plete, clear and well written overview of the
state of knowledge on climate change and
possible counter-measures. e book is an
inspiring lecture that can be recommended
to anyone interested in climate change.
Andreas Lienkamp (2009): Klimawandel
und Gerechtigkeit. Eine Ethik der Nachhal-
tigkeit in christlicher Perspektive. Munich:
Schöningh. 534 pages. ISBN: 978350676
6755. Price: 58 €.
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creation. He sees the principles of precau-
tion and polluter-pays as practical guides for
a just approach to mitigation and adapta-
tion. Lienkamp decidedly refutes the inter-
pretation of climate change as a misfortune
and labels it an injustice. He also addresses
the question of intergenerational justice in
this contect. Given the focus of the journal
this section was of special interest to the re-
viewers. Lienkamp tries to draw on the bible
to anchor his account of intergenerational
justice. In the bible, however, the obligati-
ons of children towards their parents used to
be emphasised, and not the other way
around. e Fourth Commandment, “ho-
nour thy father and mother”, is repeated
more often in the Old Testament than any
other commandment. Lienkamp interprets
this commandment as an obligation that ex-
tends the scope of the family and encom-
passes respecting the creation in its entirety
(p. 276) but this is surely not a literal rea-
ding of the bible.
On a trial basis, Lienkamp then applies
Rawls ‘veil of ignorance’ to the intergenera-
tional context but ﬁnds it very diﬃcult, re-
fering to the diﬃculties that Rawls himself
encountered (“it submits any ethical theory
to severe if not impossible tests”). Without a
real application of the ‘veil’, Lienkamp en-
dorses a preventive principle (p. 277) which
is partly in line with the results of more ela-
borate applications of the ‘veil’. en, Lien-
kamp continues by operationalizing
intergenerational justice by the three para-
meters ‘diversity’, ‘quality’ and ‘access’ (quo-
ting Edith Brown-Weiss). Afterwards,
Lienkamp mentions how ‘intergenerational
justice’ is deﬁned in the German National
Strategy for Sustainability. While some of
Lienkamp’s results are shared by the revie-
wers, the arguments he oﬀers to sustain his
results fall short of his own deliberations,
and his ethical theory is composed a bit too
haphazardly. But even if Lienkamp does not
deliver a precise ethical deﬁnition of inter-
generational justice he oﬀers some new
aspects from an theological point of view.
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arald Welzer presents his book
called Climate Wars. What is
Worth Killing for in the 21st Cen-
tury (only available in German) on the con-
sequences of climate change, the content of
which diﬀers from most literature in this
area. Welzer examines and describes the po-
tential for social conﬂict, which arises from
climate change as well as the resulting after-
eﬀects including natural disasters, resources
shortages and migration ﬂows.
Welzer approaches the topics of climate
change and violence in several stages. He
writes about the holocaust, the genocide du-
ring Rwanda's civil war and the crisis in
Darfur. In parts, the author does not man-
age to explicitly clarify the coherence be-
tween the respective chapters and the title of
the book. For example, he dedicates a de-
tailed chapter to terrorism (Red Army
Faction, Al-Qaeda, etc.), just to end it by
asserting that there was merely an indirect
connection between terrorism and climate
change. Some chapters include facts which
were already discussed extensively in preced-
ing sections of the book. During these sec-
tions the reading pleasure is limited, because
it is not obvious how the reader should gain
additional knowledge from these parts.
More careful editing of content would not
have done any harm to the book.
Despite those few weak points, Welzer’s
book is worth reading. He depicts clearly in
which way climate change causes and
accelerates the decay of statehood in wide
swaths of the ird World leading to the
emergence of force based economies. All
players involved in conﬂicts in force-based
economies have a common interest in ensur-
ing such disputes continue since they are set
to profit from it and thus foster their per-
sistence. According to Welzer, civil war,
originally a state of emergency, will become
normality in many developing countries. As
an example, Welzer mentions the crisis in
Darfur which he regards as a forerunner to
future conﬂicts, conditioned by climate
change. e consequences of climate
change, such as aridity, ﬂooding and des-
ertiﬁcation, result in the agricultural sectors
of many regions being unable to sustain the
local population. Hence, taking part in the
force-based economy appears as a rational
option to those farmers who originally lived
of subsistence agriculture.
e players in force-based economies in the
Southern hemisphere act, as far as they do
so in reaction to the consequences of climate
change, under circumstances which were set
by the industrial nations of the North. e
causes of climate change and the resulting
after-eﬀects were triggered by industrial na-
tions. Welzer clearly points to fact that those
actors who caused climate change will not -
or at least not in the beginning – be among
those who will be aﬀected by the negative
outcomes of climate change. In contrast,
those whose living conditions are worst af-
fected are much less responsible for climate
change and unlike those who caused it lack
the means to adapt to the aftermaths. ere-
fore it is little surprising, that there are ﬂows
of migration from South to North that will
gain momentum in the future, because those
regions, aﬀected by the consequences of cli-
mate change, are not capable of providing
suﬃcient means for survival. e North,
which initially would even proﬁt from
moderate global warming, will consequently
become the destination of choice for climate
change refugees from the South. In addition,
Welzer portrays the already existing coun-
teractive measures of the European Union
and the USA, which aim at detaining cli-
mate refugees before they reach their terri-
tory, e.g. by enlisting the assistance of ‘third
states’ like Morocco and Lybia, without
really being interested in the means they
resort to in order to dam up the ﬂow of mi-
gration.
e end of the book is comprised of two
chapters. In one, Welzer depicts an optimis-
tic scenario of prospective development in
which the outcomes of climate change can
be mitigated by a process of social rethin-
king in the North. In the other, Welzer de-
lineates the pessimistic version in which the
after-eﬀects are not mitigated eﬀectively be-
cause industrial nations are not able to de-
velop a new cultural and economic model in
the short time left. Should this version come
true, even the decay of societies or the
downfall of mankind becomes imaginable.
While reading the ﬁnal chapter it becomes
clear that Welzer regards the pessimistic ver-
sion as more realistic (its headline is Opti-
mism is a lack of information) and probably
only added the optimistic version as a glim-
mer of hope. e lack of conviction, which
can be observed while reading the optimi-
stic variant, makes this ﬁnal chapter a less
worthwhile read as one notices that Welzer is
not really invested in this version.
To conclude, reading the book is quite
worthwhile because it deals with the social
consequences of climate change in a well-in-
formed and intensive in-depth manner by
dramatically highlighting the social after-
maths of global warming.
Harald Welzer (2008): Klimakriege. Wofür
im 21. Jahrhundert getötet wird.
Frankfurt am Main: S. Fisher. 300 pages.
ISBN: 3100894332. Price: 19.90 €.
HaraldWelzer:
Klimakriege.Wofür im 21. Jahrhundert getötet wird
Reviewed by Adrian Schell
H
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by Burns H. Weston
Director and Senior Researcher, Climate
Legacy Initiative
Visiting Distinguished Professor of Interna-
tional Law and Policy, Vermont Law School
Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor
of Law Emeritus and Senior Scholar, Center
for Human Rights, e University of Iowa
and Tracy Bach
Associate Director and Senior Research Fellow,
Climate Legacy Initiative
Professor of Law, Vermont Law School
e Climate Legacy Initiative
(CLI) is a joint project of Vermont
Law School’s Environmental Law
Center and e University of Iowa’s Center
for Human Rights (UICHR). Launched in
Spring 2007 to research and analyze how
current law (national and international, in-
digenous and foreign) conceptualizes and
codiﬁes the ethical rights and duties that
exist between present and future generations
ecologically, it was triggered by climate
change – which the UN’s Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other
leading environmental scientists have
persuasively demonstrated to be, in modern
times, the consequence largely of human
activity, generating carbon buildups in the
atmosphere that now threaten life on Earth
as we know it. In this setting, building on
work by Professor Edith Brown Weiss [In
Fairness to Future Generations (1989)], it
has sought to answer intriguing and gener-
ally unexplored legal questions: Is it possible
for US law, the law of other countries, indig-
enous peoples’ law, and/or international law
to deﬁne the rights of future generations to
a clean, healthy, and sustainable environ-
ment? Likewise, can law impose a duty on
current generations to pass on a climate
legacy of this sort?
In Spring 2009, the CLI gave birth to a 108-
page Policy Paper, complete with 624 pages
of Background Papers (Appendix A) and
Recommendations (Appendix B), docu-
menting this research and more. Titled
Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the
Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human
Rights, and Intergenerational Justice, it makes
the scholarly case that ecological protections
for future generations and concomitant
present-day obligations relative to them are
supported by plausible and persuasive theo-
ries of social justice (particularly when the
theories are grounded on the value of re-
spect, the core value of human rights). It
ﬁnds, too, a broad consensus that this obli-
gation must take the form of (a) preserving
diversity of natural and cultural resource op-
tions comparable to those enjoyed by
previous generations; (b) maintaining the
quality of the planet so that it is passed on in
no worse condition than when received, and
repairing it where necessary to meet this
duty; and (c) providing members of current
generations equitable access to the legacy of
past generations and conserving this access
for future generations. Additionally, it iden-
tiﬁes and evaluates existing laws that support
and codify the obligation to leave an ecolo-
gically livable world to future generations.
On ﬁnal analysis, however, the Policy Paper
ﬁnds these expressions of intergenerational
concern to be, overall, much too limited in
scope and practice to meet the challenge of
presently ominous and potentially cata-
strophic climate change.
In this spirit, the Policy Paper calls for a gen-
eral paradigm shift in legal thought and
action relative to the environment. It argues
for new legal norms, institutions, and pro-
cedures that give to the ecological rights and
interests of present and future generations at
least equal standing with the essentially mar-
ket-driven norms and practices that rule
worldwide today but which were crafted
during and for a bygone 19th century Indus-
trial Revolution and its priorities and inter-
ests. ”Present and impending climate
change,” it observes, “brings us face to face
with stark, discomﬁting images of a non-fu-
ture. […] Business-as-usual now appears as
an irreversible experiment with the only
atmosphere humans have.”
e CLI Policy Paper therefore concludes
that, to meet the climate change challenge,
our world needs a heavy dose of intellectual
and moral daring committed to ensuring
“an ecological legacy […] that will beneﬁt
our children, grandchildren, great-grand-
children, and other future generations. [...]”
To this end, it calls for the litigation of select
cases and the reinterpretation of existing
laws sensitive to the preciousness of all life
on Earth. Also, in a manner intended to
stimulate – not foreclose – dialogue and in-
novation, the Policy Paper urges progress on
sixteen legal initiatives “that leave a legacy of
ecological justice for future generations”
deﬁned by the ideal of a clean, healthy, and
sustainable global environment for all.
Among them are the following:
• the adoption of state and national consti-
tutional amendments and statutes establish-
ing the rights of present and future
generations to clean, healthy, and sustainable
environments;
• the enactment of state environmental pro-
tection acts (SEPAs) to complement and
strengthen, and a national environmental le-
gacy act (NELA) to supplement, already
existing but weak national environmental
protection laws, the US National Environ-
mental Protection Act (NEPA) in particular;
Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature:
Climate Change, Human Rights, and Intergenerational Justice
T
“Intergenerational Justice
and the Scourge of War”
We are looking for articles in English for the
upcoming issue 1/2010 of the IGJR with
the topic “Intergenerational Justice and the
Scourge of War”.
e Charter of the United Nations signed
in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 starts with
the words ‘We the peoples of the United Na-
tions determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind
[…]’. e Charter was obviously formu-
lated and signed under the impression of the
recently ended Second World War, which
was the single event with the sharpest de-
crease of human welfare in history. e pri-
orities have since shifted during an era of
unprecedented peace in the OECD world
and on a global scale. But even though as
many as 192 states have signed the UN
Charter, starting with an expression of de-
termination to rid the world of the scourge
of war, conﬂicts still ravage large parts of the
world, particularly in Africa, the Middle
East and Central Asia. According to ﬁndings
of the AKUF (Working Group on the
Causes of Wars) in Hamburg, Germany, the
number of conﬂicts has even steadily risen
since the end of the Second World War,
while inner state conﬂicts increasingly
dominate the statistics.
e persistence of the institution of 'war'
might be the greatest threat of all to future
generations. Its negative consequences for
the future of societies are obvious. Apart
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from the people dying, traumatised soldiers
and victims pass down the psychological da-
mages they suﬀered in war times to the fu-
ture generations as parents. Additionally
new forms of inner state conﬂicts have a
much longer duration in comparison to clas-
sic interstate wars and leave the economies,
state structures and societies of the states
they ravaged in ruins for decades to come.
us modern inner state conﬂicts are more
likely to aﬀect future generations than clas-
sical wars with clearly deﬁned warring par-
ties that usually end with a truce or a peace
treaty.
Evidently, the problem the ‘scourge of war’
poses to mankind is far from being solved.
In this context it is remarkable that studies
on intergenerational justice have so far ne-
glected the topic, especially considering that
the UN Charter speciﬁcally pointed out
‘succeeding generations’ as the beneﬁciaries
of its determination to rid the world of wars.
e upcoming issue 1/2010 of the Inter-
generational Justice Review addresses this
issue, with the aim to establish the ground-
work for a comprehensive discussion of
peace policies in the scope of intergenera-
tional justice. e issue aims to clarify the
relation between the rights of present and
future generations for a peaceful life, the role
of humanitarian interventions based on
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
interventions in general. is includes
interventions for conﬂict management,
peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peace-
keeping, state and nation building.
Weapons of mass destruction pose an ex-
ceptional danger to the future of mankind.
erefore the ban and demolition of nuclear
arms as well as the elimination of chemical
and biological weapon are important ele-
ments of the topic.
Deadline for the submission of full
articles is 1 November 2009.
“Possibilities and limits of party coopera-
tion in democracies”
e editors are seeking articles in English for
an upcoming issue in 2010 of the IGJR with
the topic “Possibilities and limits of party co-
operation in democracies”.
Every democratic system requires the com-
petition of political parties and parliament
factions, and to a certain degree it is part of
the democratic role play to maintain such
competition. Nevertheless, in a democratic
system it is important to aim for as much
competition as needed and as much coope-
ration as possible, in order to achieve the
majorities for necessary decisions. Demo-
cracy is always a struggle to balance between
cooperation and competition. Across the
globe there are many diﬀerent approaches to
ﬁnding this balance; the British Majority
system, the concordance system in Switzer-
land, the coalition system in Germany and
the Presidential democracies of France and
the USA. All can be said to have their ad-
vantages, but do any of these systems ensure
that not only the current needs are addressed
in order to please voters and win votes, but
• the adoption of cap-and-trade regulations
for allocations to energy eﬃciency;
• the creation of sky trusts and other environ-
mental stakeholder trusts to sustain and
safeguard common ecological assets;
• the expansion of the public trust doctrine
beyond its current limited application to
safeguard the entire environment for present
and future generations;
• the establishment of legal guardians for fu-
ture generations, with provision for their
training and certiﬁcation;
• the adoption of UN resolutions aimed at
protecting the ecological rights and interests
of present and future generations, including
a call for the establishment of the atmos-
phere as a global commons protected by
precautionary principles and strong enforce-
ment powers; and
• the ﬁne tuning of international trade rules
to the ecological needs and interests of fu-
ture generations.
“It is impossible to think,” the CLI Policy
Paper asserts, “that creative responses to the
climate change challenge can be successful
without innovative as well as eﬀective legal
and policy action.”
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that long term interests are implemented?
Do any of these systems practice sustainable
politics?
Take for example the complicated decision
making in the political system of Germany,
a system that requires the consensus of many
actors often recompensing blockades. e
non-appearance of costly reforms, for exam-
ple in climate protection, are examples
which illustrate that measures often oriented
to the future can and are being blocked by
single parties. In this case future generations
in particular are disadvantaged by the ab-
sence of functional collaboration of parties.
Deadline for the submission of abstracts
is 1 November 2009.
Deadline for the submission of full arti-
cles is 1 December 2009.
importance of generational justice in climate
change mitigation and adaptation at the con-
ference and at various side events.
Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment
Since April 2009, Joerg Chet Tremmel is a
Visiting Research Fellow at the London School
of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Al-
though he works in the Centre for Philosophy
of Natural and Social Science, he also follows
closely climate research activities that take
place at LSE. e “Grantham Research Insti-
tute on Climate Change and the Environ-
ment” is the new home to climate-change and
environment research at LSE.1 e Institute is
chaired by Lord Stern of Brentford, author of
the 2006 Stern Review,2 and brings together
international expertise on economics, ﬁnance,
geography, the environment, international
development and political economy to estab-
lish a world-leading centre for policy-relevant
research and training in climate change and the
environment.
e Institute has been funded by philanthrop-
ists Jeremy and Hannelore Grantham, through
their Grantham Foundation for the Protection
of the Environment. It works closely with the
Grantham Institute for Climate Change at Im-
perial College London, established last year
also with funding from the Grantham Foun-
dation. A common advisory board oversees the
work of both Institutes.
Upcoming event:
Public lecture: 'Climate Change: Are We Heading
for a New Cold War?' ursday 1 October 2009,
6.30-8pm, Old eatre, Old Building, LSE.
Speaker: Professor Graciela Chichilnisky. ere
is an historic standoﬀ between China and the
US on the issue of global warming. Neither
wants to limit emissions unless the other does
so ﬁrst. In Copenhagen (December 2009) the
nations of the world will decide whether to re-
solve the Global Warming problem extending
Kyoto after 2012 – or to start a new Cold War
of escalating emissions – the outcome of which
may determine the fate of humankind. Profes-
sor Graciela Chichilnisky suggests two modest
improvements to the Kyoto Protocol that
could resolve the impasse and literally save the
day. ese unique proposals have received
positive attention in China and in the US. But
will they be adopted in Copenhagen?
Graciela is Director of Columbia Consortium
for Risk Management and Professor of Eco-
nomics and Statistics at Columbia University.
is event celebrates her newest book Saving
Kyoto.
-
1) http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/grantham
Institute/Default.htm
2) http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview
_index.htm
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FRFG at the COP15 United Nations Cli-
mate Change Conference Copenhagen 2009
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sion for the UN Climate Change Conference
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will attend the talks with two observers in
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